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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 “Freedom of contracts” has two components: (1) the familiar 
freedom to bargain for terms within a contract and (2) the long-neglected 
freedom to choose from among contract types.  Theories built on the first 
freedom have reached an impasse; attention to the second points toward a 
long-elusive goal, a liberal and general theory of contract law.  This theory 
is liberal because it develops an appealing conception of contractual 
autonomy grounded in the actual diversity of contract types.  It is general 
because it explains how contract values – utility, community, and 
autonomy – properly relate to each other across contract types.  Finally, it 
is a theory of contract law because it covers the field as a whole, including 
for example marriage, employment, and consumer contracts, not just 
arm’s length widget sales.   
 “Freedom of contracts” illuminates numerous puzzles in contract 
doctrines from liquidated damages to promissory estoppel and across the 
ABCs of contract types – agency, bailment, consumer transactions, etc.  
Our approach also generates a range of novel theoretical propositions.  For 
example, it explains how sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within 
a contract type can actually increase freedom, so long as law offers 
sufficient choice among types. Finally, it offers law-and-economics 
contract scholars a way to situate efficiency analysis within a normatively 
appealing liberal framework.  In sum, “freedom of contracts” suggests a 
refocus of how contract theory should be pursued – and how contract law 
should be designed and taught.   
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325254 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Contract theory has lost touch with contract law.  Existing theories 
all fall short.  Some fit poorly with doctrine; others are conceptually 
muddled; the rest, normatively disappointing.  Surveying the field, one 
observer notes, “[T]oday there is no generally recognized theory of 
contract,” and concludes, “The effort to develop a coherent explanation of 
contract seems to have reached an impasse.”1 
 There is no impasse.  A doctrinally well-fit, conceptually coherent, 
and normatively attractive account of contract is in view.  This Article 
points the way through an approach we call “freedom of contracts.”  
Freedom of contracts is the sum of two components, which together 
constitute contractual autonomy: (1) the familiar freedom to bargain for 
terms within a contract, and (2) the long-neglected freedom to choose from 
among contract types.2  As we will show, attention to choice among types 
can repair the broken link between contract theory and law. 
We would like to claim the phrase “freedom of contract” – without 
the “s” – but we leave the familiar term aside because of its troublesome 
connotations.  Outside the legal academy, “freedom of contract” largely 
serves as a slogan for laissez-faire capitalism.  Even within contract 
theory, the term retains a particular libertarian flavor.  It is most often 
associated with freedom as negative liberty, that is, with the idea 
“fundamental in the orthodox understanding of contract law, that the 
content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law.”3  
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1
  Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 29, 29 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2nd ed., 2010). 
 
2
  These two components encompass a third, an overarching voluntariness 
principle that is sometimes labeled “freedom from contract.”  We discuss the role 
of voluntariness in our theory in Part III.B.2, infra. 
 
3
  STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59, 139 (2004).  For an early 
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In this view, contractual freedom “has very little to do” with contract law 
and is thus perceived as “largely irrelevant” to its design.4  The law should 
just enforce private deals and otherwise get out of the way.  Freedom of 
this negative sort is a non-trivial aspect of contracting.  At times, people 
really do want to bargain for terms within their own idiosyncratic deal and 
they need the law to do no more than enforce their joint agreement.   
But bargaining for terms is not the dominant mode of contracting, 
and it should not determine, as it long has, the central meaning of 
contractual freedom.  Usually, when people enter contracts, they are not 
designing their deal from scratch.  For most of us, most of the time – if we 
get married, start a new job, buy insurance, or click “I accept” – 
contractual freedom means the ability to choose from among a 
normatively-attractive range of already-existing contract types and then, 
perhaps, make a few contextual adjustments.  The mainstay of present-day 
contracting is the choice among types, with each type using distinctive 
doctrinal features to embody its particular normative concerns.  For 
example, we have waiting periods to dissolve marriage contracts, 
limitations on employee noncompete agreements, “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine in insurance contracts, and generous return rules in 
consumer transactions.  These doctrinal rules are not oddities to be 
explained away.  Rather, they are clues to and reflections of the divergent 
normative concerns of each contract type.   
 Over the past century, contract theory has progressively lost touch 
with the role of contract types.  If you ask theorists about diverse marriage 
contract types, many answer: that’s family law, not contracts.  How about 
employment contracts?  That’s labor law.  Consumer transactions?  Part of 
the regulatory state.  Rather than embracing diverse types, contract theory 
has shrunk its focus to a single universal, trans-substantive image – the 
arm’s length commercial widget sale.  Unfortunately, contract law 
teaching has followed this scholarly lead and contracts casebooks have 
  
incarnation of this view, see Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL 
L.Q. 365, 368-69, 373 (1921). 
 
4
  Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 81 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). But cf. Randy E. Barnett, The 
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 
(1992). 
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marginalized most real-world contracting practices from their explanatory 
field.5  But contract law is not the shapeless, “general” law taught to 
generations of first-year students.  Diverse family, work, home, and 
consumer contract types are at least as central to our shared contracting 
experience as are widget sales.  So, we reject the idea that the core of 
contracting is dickering over terms in an arm’s length deal.  While such 
transactions are surely important, they are not the platonic type of any 
contracting sphere, not even in commerce. 
 Attention to choice among types opens the door to a liberal and 
general theory of contract law.  To qualify as liberal, contract theory must 
be grounded in an appealing conception of contractual autonomy.6  But 
contractual autonomy is not self-defining.  Just the opposite.  Pinning it 
down is tough, much tougher than the concept’s easy intuitive appeal 
suggests.7  Existing liberal contract theories – primarily libertarian in the 
United States and neo-Kantian in Canada and Europe – may fit well with 
aspects of arm’s length contracting, but each fails when expanded to cover 
contract law as a whole.  Descriptively, they miss the texture of why we 
contract with one another; conceptually, they overlook key features of 
contractual autonomy; normatively, they slight the diverse goods of 
contracting.  These failures help explain why many law-and-economics 
and communitarian contract scholars disclaim a liberal foundation to their 
work.  But the turn away from liberal principles is detrimental and 
premature. 
 The first theoretical contribution of our approach is to offer a 
liberal conception of contractual autonomy grounded in, and well-adapted 
  
 
5
   See LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 25 (1965) 
(modern contract law courses are like “a zoology course which confined its study 
to dodos and unicorns”); but see MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN 
ACTION (3rd ed. 2011) (a rare contracts casebook still organized around types). 
 
6
  Liberalism as such need not be grounded in autonomy.  But for contract 
law in particular, we doubt that foundational alternatives such as political 
liberalism can prove adequate, a point we discuss in Part IV.A, infra. 
 
7
  Cf. Mark Pettit Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and 
Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999). See also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
641-42 (1943) (“freedom of contract must mean different things for different 
types of contract”). 
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to, the actual diversity of contract types.  We start with the familiar 
proposition that autonomy stands for the commitment that people should, 
to some degree, be the authors of their own lives.  One element of this 
autonomy – reflecting the usual meaning of freedom of contract – involves 
enforcing idiosyncratic deals.  But contract law must do more if it is to 
expand meaningful choices in service of our self-authorship.  It must also 
support freedom to choose from among normatively-attractive contract 
types.  The implications of this claim are stark.  As a start, it means that a 
state committed to human freedom must be proactive in shaping contract 
law, including a robust body of diverse types.  Sometimes, contract law 
must support missing types (say to promote minoritarian or utopian 
values), and sometimes it must limit choice so as to stabilize and channel 
cultural expectations regarding a particular contract type.  This insight 
implies that, at times, sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within a 
contract type can actually increase freedom, so long as – and this is crucial 
– law offers sufficient choice among types. 
 The second conceptual contribution of this Article is to show how 
a liberal contract theory can also be a general one.  To qualify as general, 
a theory must address the varied goods and diverse spheres of contracting. 
Accordingly, we reject the notion that any single value – utility, 
community, or even autonomy – suffices for a coherent general theory.  
Instead, we relocate most of the normative discussion to a more correct 
and productive level – relating to the diverse values that animate each type 
and the recurring dilemmas common to each sphere. (By “sphere,” we 
mean a core realm of life in which contract law can enrich how we 
legitimately enlist others to our projects).  It should be no surprise that the 
values plausibly animating marriage, employment, and consumer 
transactions differ from each other and from those driving commercial sales, 
and further that, the contract types within a single sphere offer individuals 
choices among divergent values.  Indeed, it is the availability of distinct, 
normatively-attractive types within each sphere – what we call intra-sphere 
multiplicity – that is the core requirement of freedom of contracts. 
 One collateral benefit of this approach, and a major impetus for 
this Article, is to offer law-and-economics contract scholars a more secure 
and defensible normative grounding for their work.  Much of contract law 
is, and should be, driven by efficiency concerns, but a thorough-going 
efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive:  autonomy and 
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community concerns cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you 
oppose slavery and endorse marriage.  But how do these normative 
commitments interrelate?  Solving this puzzle constitutes the third 
conceptual building block of this Article. While our liberal commitments 
place autonomy as contract law’s ultimate value, we recognize that people 
do not enter into specific contracts to become more free.  Rather, they 
contract mostly to achieve other values: utility and community.  We show 
how contract law can enhance individual autonomy while, at the same 
time, providing economic and social benefits from robust contracting.  For 
law and economics theorists of contracts, we offer a path back from the 
uncomfortable collectivist position implied by an exclusive focus on 
wealth maximization, and give them a normatively appealing way to 
situate efficiency analysis within a liberal framework.8 
Finally, to qualify as a liberal and general theory of law, we take 
seriously the generative and normative role of legal institutions.  Prior 
autonomy-based theories conflate ideal contract law with legal passivity, 
that is, with the commitment that law aim just to enforce the parties’ wills 
and maybe cure discrete market failures.  By contrast, we show that it 
must actively empower people’s relationships by shaping distinct contract 
types.  This approach provides a solid normative standpoint for reforming 
existing contract law (considering the law in its best light possible, rather 
than through its historical evolution).  Doctrinal interpretation and 
evaluation should look to the “local” animating principles of existing 
contract types, rather than any “core” principle of contract law.  While the 
market for contractual innovation is vibrant, there is no reason to believe 
that existing types either exhaust the variety of goods that people may seek 
by contracting or are best configured to support their apparent goals. 
 This Article shows that robust contract law matters even more to 
human freedom than has previously been understood.  Part I examines the 
contributions and limits of prior autonomy-based contract theories. Part II 
explores the main goods people seek from contracting – utility and 
  
 
8
  Our approach does generate four substantial theoretical distinctions from 
efficiency analysis, summarized at Part III.B.3, infra, and numerous novel 
doctrinal reforms, collected at Part IV.C.1, infra, which should all be viewed as 
friendly amendments for efficiency theorists willing to adopt a liberal foundation. 
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community – and shows why neither works alone as the ultimate contract 
value. Part III sets out our freedom of contracts theory and shows how 
contract law plays a positive, active, and previously underappreciated 
autonomy-enhancing role.  Part IV addresses the main challenges our 
approach faces and the opportunities it presents for law reform.  
Throughout, we illustrate how our approach illuminates long-standing 
puzzles in doctrines ranging from liquidated damages to promissory 
estoppel and in the ABCs of contract types – agency, bailment, consumer 
transactions, etc. 
 The “freedom of contracts” approach has several virtues:  it offers 
a normatively attractive view of freedom through law, a conceptually 
coherent account of core contract values and their interrelationships, a 
persuasive link between contract theory and contract law, and finally, a 
path for contract law reform that brings it closer to our shared ideals.  
 
I. CAN AUTONOMY BE THE CORE OF CONTRACT? 
 
 A note to readers: this Part attempt a delicate balance – we aim for 
brevity and transparency so as not to exhaust the general reader’s patience, 
while recognizing that no account of deontological autonomy is too 
intricate for the neo-Kantian contract specialist.  For those inclined to 
press on to our positive theory, the takeaway can be briefly stated: 
 (1) Any modern liberal account of contract must start with Charles 
Fried’s Contract as Promise.9  This work revived debate on the relation of 
autonomy to contract, but failed to resolve the core normative concern, 
that is, how to justify state coercion of promises.  (2) Later liberal critics 
tried to refine Fried’s account and develop a rights-based foundation for 
contract law that does not rely on its contribution to enhancing individual 
autonomy.  (3) After thirty years, we can now say this deontological 
detour has failed.  But, (4) a liberal theory is still possible if we embrace 
as its (teleological) foundation a well-tempered conception of autonomy as 
self-authorship. 
  
 
9 
 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981).  See generally Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: The 
Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 601 (2012). 
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A.  Fried’s Reset 
 
 The first and most enduring contribution of Contract as Promise 
was to push back against generations of theorists – from Fuller and Perdue 
in the 1930s through Gilmore and Atiyah in the 1970s10 – who sought to 
fold contract into the fields of tort and restitution.  At a moment when 
critics had already announced The Death of Contract, Fried offered a 
powerful moral justification, grounded in Kantian notions of individual 
autonomy, for continuing to take contract seriously.11  Contract, as he 
explained, increases individual autonomy by empowering people to enlist 
others to their projects.12  This intuition is robust.13   
 Fried’s specific theory, however, has not held up as well.  The 
challenge for his Kantian “conception of the will binding itself,” which he 
puts “at the heart of the promise principle,” is to justify the coercive 
practices of contract law.14  For Fried, the commitment to keeping promises 
is premised on the trust that a promise invokes regarding the future actions of 
the promisor.15  This trust, in turn, can only be justified by reference to the 
social convention of promising.  Fried explains that this convention increases 
our autonomy by expanding our options in the long run.  Promising enables 
us to achieve objectives that we can succeed in accomplishing only with the 
cooperation of others.16   
  
 
10
  See generally L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT (1979). 
 
11 
 See FRIED, supra note 9, at 17 (justifying obligation to keep promises in 
“basic Kantian principles of trust and respect”). 
 
12 
 Id. at 8. 
 
13
  Thomas Gutmann, Some Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory of 
Contract, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing “the notion 
of contract is inherently founded on the idea of two or more persons realizing 
individual self-determination by means of voluntarily entering legally binding 
agreements”). 
 
14
  FRIED, supra note 9, at 3. 
 
15
  Id. at 9. 
 
16
  Id. at 13-14. 
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 But why should the state coerce performance of the promise absent 
detrimental reliance by the promisee?  Why should free individuals not be 
able to change their minds without liability?  Fried recognizes the difficulty 
in closing the gap between the moral value of promise and a state’s use of 
coercion:  the social value engendered by trusting promises does not “show 
why I should not take advantage of it in a particular case and yet fail to keep 
my promise.”17  Nonetheless, Fried continues, the individual obligation of 
promise-keeping is grounded “in respect for individual autonomy and in 
trust.”18  The promisor intentionally invokes a convention whose function is 
“to give grounds – moral grounds – for another to expect the promised 
performance.”19  To renege on a promise is, therefore, to abuse the trust and 
thus the vulnerability of the promisee, both of which the promisor freely 
invited; it amounts to wrongful exploitation of another individual.  In short, 
contracts – which are a genus of promises – must be kept because promises 
must be kept; and promises must be kept because promising is “a device that 
free, moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and 
which gathers its moral force from that premise.”20 
 Here’s the problem:  from the Kantian perspective Fried occupies, 
his formulation does not close the justificatory gap, but just relocates it.  An 
ethical duty not to abuse someone’s trust does not necessarily justify a legal 
duty for the same.21  Thus, Fried’s rights-based commitment sits 
uncomfortably atop a consequentialist foundation concerned with 
maintaining trust.  By mixing together these incompatible moral 
foundations,22 Fried opened the door for the deontological detour to come. 
 
  
 
17
  Id. at 14. 
 
18
  Id. at 16. 
 
19
  Id.   
 
20
  Id. at 17. 
 
21
  Benson, supra note 1, at 43-44. 
 
 
22 
 We do not imply that there is no way to accommodate consequentialism 
with deontology. For an interesting attempt, see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010).  However, their approach to contract, 
id. at ch.9, is quite different from ours.  
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B.   The Deontological Detour 
 
 1.  Transfer theory.  Following Fried, the core question has 
remained:  what justifies legal coercion of the promisor?  While there have 
been many answers, the key element they share is the notion that a 
contract transfers something, some “thing.”  Peter Benson offers one 
version of the argument:  first, he argues (contra Fried) that abusing a 
promisee’s trust may be ethically blameworthy, but that blameworthiness 
should not give rise to legal liability, absent detrimental reliance.23  As he 
puts it, if “there is no basis for holding that nonperformance injures 
anything that belongs to the promisee,” then there is “no basis for 
concluding that the promisor should be made to hand over the equivalent 
of the promised performance as a matter of compensation.”24   
 This view suggests Benson’s second point:  that contract law – 
which notably does enforce wholly executory contracts – can be justified 
only if the contract itself already transfers from the promisor to the 
promisee “a legally protected interest,”25 so that “performance respects 
those rights whereas breach injures them,”26 and thus the transfer justifies 
the state’s intervention to correct this wrong.27  If the theory works, it’s the 
transfer, not the promise, that justifies state coercion on rights-based 
grounds, wholly apart from consequentialist concerns like preserving trust 
or enhancing autonomy.28  This is the core move not just of Benson, but 
  
 
 
23 
 Peter Benson, Contract as Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1673, 1682 (2007). 
 
 24 
 Id. at 1683.  Jody Kraus, in defense of Fried, argues that the role of the ex 
ante perspective in his account is limited to the background conventions that inform 
the parties’ expectations and is thus compatible with the deontic commitment 
simply to “vindicate the parties’ pre-existing rights.” Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of 
Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 728-29 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
But this still does not explain why these expectations need to be forcibly enforced. 
 
 25 
 Benson, supra note 23, at 1683. 
 
 26 
 Id. at 1674. 
  
27 
 Id. at 1707.  
  
28 
 See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive 
Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1111-12 (1989).  
 [9/12/2013 Draft]   FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS  
 
10 
also of all the “transfer theorists” following Fried.29  Their challenge has 
been to explain what exactly contracts transfer and how they do so. 
 While transfer theorists vary in nuance,30 Arthur Ripstein, the 
group’s most rigorous neo-Kantian, aptly captures their general 
orientation.  Contract, for Ripstein, is “the legal means through which 
persons are entitled to make arrangements for themselves, and so to 
change their respective rights and duties.”31  The starting point of his 
analysis of contract – like the premise of his general theory of law – is an 
individual’s right to personal independence.  Unlike more robust 
conceptions of autonomy as self-authorship, Kantian independence is not a 
good to be promoted but a constraint on the conduct of others, which is 
exhausted by the requirement that no one gets to tell anyone else what 
purposes to pursue.32  Against this background, contract gets its 
significance by enabling free people to “set and pursue their own purposes 
interdependently.”33  Here, consent is conceptualized as “two persons 
uniting their wills to create new rights and duties between them.”34  A 
united will can justify transfer of a preexisting right; it can also “create 
new rights, including rights to things that need not exist as fully 
determinate antecedent to the transfer.”35  Ripstein’s reasoning is complex, 
but his bottom-line is simple: through a transaction based on a united will, 
the promisee receives title to compel the promisor’s future performance.36 
 2. Three shared features.  This brief summary suffices to highlight 
three characteristic features of transfer theories. (a) As just mentioned, 
transfer theorists are committed to the conceptual view that the act of 
  
 
 29 
 This term was coined by Stephen Smith, see SMITH, supra note 3, at 97-99, 
but transfer theory relies on a rich natural law pedigree. See, e.g., Helge Dedek, A 
Particle of Freedom: Natural Law Thought and the Kantian Theory of Transfer 
by Contract, 25 CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 313 (2012). 
 
 
30 
 See, e.g., Benson, supra note 23, at 1719-31. 
 
 
 
31 
 ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 107 (2009).  
 
32 
  Id. at 14, 34, 45.  
 
33 
 Id. at 107. 
 
 
34 Id. at 109.  See also id. at 122-23. 
 
 
35 
 Id. at 116. 
 
 
36 
 Id. at 127.  For a similar interpretation of Kant’s position, see ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 153-54 (2012). 
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contracting transfers an entitlement to the promisee (either an entitlement 
that pre-exists the contract,37 or one that the contract itself creates).  This 
point is the basis of their claim that breach must be understood as “an 
interference with the promisee’s ownership interest acquired at contract 
formation,” and thus an injury which the law corrects based on strict 
adherence to the parties’ Kantian independence.38 
 (b) Next, transfer theorists converge also on at least one important 
doctrinal point.  While implicit in Ripstein’s account,39 the doctrinal point 
explicitly engages Randy Barnett.40  He criticizes Fried for relying on “an 
inquiry as to the promisor’s actual state of mind at the time of agreement” – 
in contrast to the objective theory that dominates contract law.41  Barnett 
uses this problem of doctrinal fit to assert a deeper deficiency in Fried’s 
account: its inadequate attention to “the interrelational function of contract 
law,” which both explains and justifies law’s use of “a manifested intention 
to be legally bound” as the “criterion of enforceability.”42  There are many 
steps between Barnett’s doctrinal observation and his positive account.43  We 
omit them here and raise his work only to note that transfer theorists in 
general endorse contract doctrine’s objective approach. 
(c) The final, and most significant, commonality relates to shared 
normative focus on negative liberty.  Thus, for Barnett, the function of 
contract doctrine is to set clearly “the boundaries of protected domains,”44 
which means that it should “identify the rights of individuals engaged in 
transferring entitlements, and thereby indicate when physical or legal force 
may legitimately be used.”45  The significance for Barnett of clear 
  
 
 
37 
 Some transfer theorists engage in acrobatic exercises to establish that, prior 
to contracting, the transferred entitlement belonged to the promisee.  See, e.g., 
Benson, supra note 23, at 1693-1719; Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of 
Contract, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 31-42, 50-53 (2009). 
 
 
38 
 Benson, supra note 23, at 1707. 
 
 
39 
 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 124, 126. 
 
40
  Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
269 (1986). 
 
41
  Id. at 272. 
 
42
  Id. at 320. 
 
43
  See id. at 303, 306.   
 
44
  Id. at 302. 
 
45
  Id. at 295. 
 [9/12/2013 Draft]   FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS  
 
12 
boundaries emerges from his commitment to Nozickian individual 
independence, in which individual rights require that “the boundaries 
within which individuals may live, act, and pursue happiness [are] free of 
the forcible interference of others.”46  Barnett’s libertarian account finds a 
nice echo in Ripstein’s Kantian commitment to an individual’s right to 
independence.  Though the paths differ, their normative views largely 
converge.47  Both call for a sharply limited, passive role for the state in 
providing contract law – the law is morally justified in doing no more than 
enforcing the deal to which the parties have mutually consented. 
 
C. Why the Deontological Turn Fails 
 
This concerted effort over the past thirty years to craft a rights-based 
account of contractual autonomy, purged of Fried’s covert teleological 
moves, has reached a dead end.  The failure is unsurprising because 
transfer theory is question-begging; and without transfer as a premise, 
deontological contract theories collapse into a freestanding and 
normatively-dubious version of libertarianism.  Our critique focuses here 
on transfer theorists’ conceptual and normative claims.  (Their doctrinal 
point regarding the objective basis of contract law is widely accepted,48 
and we also endorse it for reasons that become clear below.)  
 1.  The conceptual muddle.  The conceptual claim of transfer 
theory fails in two ways.  (a) The first has to do with the non-self-defining 
nature of ownership.  All transfer accounts ground contract in ownership, 
either ownership of one’s future actions or of the right the contracting 
parties create. They assume our “sole and despotic dominion”49 over these 
entitlements, such that we can wholly transfer them, and such that law 
should back up that commitment.  But why?   
  
 
46
  Id. at 291. 
 
47
  Ripstein is eager, however, to distinguish himself from Nozick by, for 
example, defending anti-discrimination rules.  See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 
292. 
 
48
  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b; E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 (4th ed. 2004). 
 
49
  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*2 (University of Chicago ed., 1979) (1765-69). 
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 Neither the range of transferability, nor even its inclusion within 
the scope of an owner’s entitlement, is self-defining.50 Ownership (and 
property) is open to competing interpretations and permutations.  There is 
no inevitable content to the concept – even Blackstone never had a simple 
Blackstonian vision of ownership51 – and no arbitration among the 
different available conceptions is possible without pre-commitment to 
some normative apparatus.52  Viewing contract as a transfer of ownership 
just buries contract’s moral underpinnings in a naïve view of property.53  
Reducing contract to property is no more promising than the pre-Fried 
reliance theorists’ turn to tort and restitution.   
 (b) The second conceptual problem with the deontological turn, 
even more crucial for our current purposes, is its problematic 
understanding of contract law.  In line with Fried’s notion that contracts 
must be kept because promises must be kept, transfer theorists’ accounts 
suggest that contract is duty-imposing.54  While analyzing tort law 
doctrines dealing with our bodily integrity in these terms may make sense 
– assuming people have such pre-legal and pre-conventional rights, tort 
law affirms the correlative duties against their violation – contract law 
  
 
50
  For a provocative argument along these lines, see J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA 
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 88-90 (1997) (arguing that the right to sell is not 
conceptually inherent in ownership, but the right to give is). 
 
51
  See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxieties, 
108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a 
Blackstonian, 10 THEO. INQ. L. 103 (2009). 
 
52
  Nothing here should be interpreted as supporting the view that property 
is just a “laundry list” of substantive rights with a limitless number of possible 
permutations.  See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND 
INSTITUTIONS pt. I (2011). 
 
53
  Neo-Kantians have attempted to develop a conception of property that is 
securely detached from any consequentialist concerns. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 
31, at chs. 4 & 9; WEINRIB, supra note 36, at ch. 8.  But such accounts prove 
implausible.  See DAGAN, supra note 52, at 63-66. 
 
54
  See Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and 
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1726-27 (2008). This feature is 
conspicuous in the understanding of contracts Seana Shiffrin has advanced in 
recent years.  See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and 
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007). 
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works differently.55  Rather than vindicating existing rights, contract law is 
first and foremost power-conferring.   
We agree that duties not to interfere with people’s rights are relevant 
to contract law, but they are secondary.  Rules concerning duress, fraud 
and the like, which aim at ensuring that people not be forced into 
contracts, do impose duties.  However, these duty-imposing areas of 
contract doctrine rely on the same normative commitments that explain 
and justify law’s support for allowing people to self-impose obligations in 
the first place.56  Even more fundamentally, these piggy-backing (duty-
imposing) rules – which safeguard contracts’ voluntariness – would be 
meaningless in the absence of (power-conferring) contracts: their role is to 
protect our ability to apply the powers enabled by contract, and they 
would be pointless in a world that does not recognize the power to 
contract. 
As a power-conferring body of law, contract law “attaches legal 
consequences to certain acts” in order “‘to enable people to affect norms 
and their application in such a way if they desire to do so for this 
purpose.’”57  This feature captures the empowering role of contract that 
Fried identified and Jody Kraus later highlights.  As Kraus explains, 
contract is “a particularly valuable means for pursuing ends,” because by 
recognizing people’s power to undertake obligations, it allows individuals 
to provide credible assurances “to induce promisees to assist them in 
realizing their ends.”58   
Does the objective theory of contract undermine this conceptual 
point?  We think not.  Here’s the potential difficulty, per Gregory Klass: a 
  
 
55
  See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1608-09, 1614-15 (2009). See also Daniel Markovits, 
Making and Keeping Promises, 92 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1352-66 (2006) (launching 
an analogous critique of T.M. Scanlon’s harm-based theory of promises and 
contracts which neglects the reasons for making contracts).  But cf. Curtis 
Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Contract from 
Tort?, 45 SUFF. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2012) (arguing that contract is power-
conferring and is still “organized around the moral duty to keep promises.”). 
 
56
  See Klass, supra note 54, at 1765; Kraus, supra note 55, at 1619. 
 
57
  Klass, supra note 54, at 1739 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON 
AND NORMS 102 (1975)). 
 
58
  Kraus, supra note 55, at 1608-09. 
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purely power-conferring doctrine should be designed to “ensure that a 
person’s acts result in legal change only when it is her purpose to achieve 
such a change,” whereas contract law merely “ensures that a significant 
proportion of actors . . . are likely to have such a purpose.”59  The 
objective theory of contract fails to “include mechanisms to prevent 
inadvertent exercises of the power.”60  Nevertheless, it does not undermine 
our claim.  As Kraus argues, “making subjective intent a necessary 
condition for making a promise” would have frustrated “the point of 
promising” or at least severely limited its role only to “individuals who 
make promises to people who already trust them.”61  Therefore, promisors 
“would choose to make their promises objectively binding.”62   
Kraus does acknowledge the downside of objective theory to 
personal autonomy: it undermines “the negative right of individuals 
(merely objective promisors) to be free from subjectively unintended 
obligations.”63  But as Kraus asserts, the law justifiably follows the 
prescriptions of “personal sovereignty” – the conception of individual 
autonomy on which promissory morality relies64 – to “give priority to 
respect for the positive liberty of faultless individuals” who “choose to 
undertake objectively binding promises,” over the “negative liberty of 
blameworthy individuals.”65  Contract law cannot be neutral in such a 
zero-sum contest, and given the inter-subjective context in which it 
operates, it correctly opts for the objective theory.66 
2.  The normative link.  This conclusion not only explains the secure 
status of objective theory, but also reveals why deontologists’ resistance to 
considering consequences – even consequences to people’s autonomy – 
cannot work.  Contract is irreducibly concerned with power-conferring 
  
 
59
  Klass, supra note 54, at 1730. 
 
60
  Id. at 1754.   
 
61
  Kraus, supra note 55, at 1620-21. 
 
62
  Id. at 1623-24.  
 
63
  Id. at 1624. 
 
64
  Id. at 1609. 
 
65
  Id. at 1624-25. 
 
66
  By contrast, in unilateral contexts – think about mistaken payments cases 
with no detrimental reliance – private law (here, restitution) traditionally does 
vindicate the transferor’s subjective intent.  See generally HANOCH DAGAN, THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 40-45 (2004). 
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rules; even Ripstein begins his account by stating that contract is the 
“means” that entitles persons “to make arrangements for themselves, and 
so to change their respective rights and duties.”67  In certain contexts – 
especially in close-knit groups – these rules may be conventional (social 
norms enforced notably via the parties’ reputational concerns).68  In many 
others, contracting heavily relies on the law, so that by subjecting 
themselves to the potential deployment of “the powerful institutionalized 
mechanisms” of contract law, people who have no preexisting reason to 
trust one another can cooperate, and each can rely on the other’s 
rationality as the sole necessary safeguard.69  Moreover, even for parties 
guided by their own social norms, contract law often provides background 
safeguards, a safety net for a rainy day that can help catalyze trust in their 
routine, happier interactions.70  Thus, law (or a law-like social convention) 
shapes, and does not merely reflect, the interpersonal practice of 
contracting, and in designing contract law, we necessarily make choices 
that affect the contours of the parties’ bilateral relationship.   
The relevant question for an autonomy-based contract law is not 
what constraints to people’s autonomy are legitimate (as it is for many 
aspects of tort law); rather, it is how should contract law enhance people’s 
autonomy.71  That is necessarily an ex ante discussion dealing with the 
ways law can facilitate forms of bilateral voluntary obligations that are 
  
 
67 
 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 107; see also Benson, supra note 1, at 37 
(“Autonomy theories view contract law as a legal institution that recognizes and 
respects the power of private individuals to effect changes in their legal relations 
inter se, within limits.”). 
 
68
  See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract 
Law and the State of Nature, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985). 
 
69
  DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF CONTRACT 55, 58, 60, 65 (2003). See also, e.g., Michael G. Pratt, 
Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 56 L. & PHIL. 531, 572 (2007). 
 
70
  Cf. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 
YALE L.J. 549, 578-79 (2001). 
 
71
  Cf. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 234 (1991). See also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, 
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489 
(1989) (arguing theories which found the binding force of promises on individual 
autonomy “have little or no relevance” to most parts of contract law).  
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conducive to contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos.  This inquiry is 
qualitative, rather than quantitative (it is not about maximizing the amount 
of autonomy in the world).  But it is teleological nonetheless: we are 
looking for the system that generates the most autonomy-friendly 
implications.72 
Libertarian contract theorists, like Barnett, may admit that law 
matters and still endorse a minimalist role for contract law – along the 
lines of the boundary-crossing principle suitable for Robert Nozick’s 
night-watchman state.73  But there is nothing particular to contract law that 
justifies this view.  If a minimalist libertarian view of the state appeals to 
you, then Barnett’s view could plausibly inform your approach to contract 
law.74   
Notice the tectonic shift in the nature of this last argument: we are 
now seeking a normatively-attractive view of individual autonomy to 
guide the state in shaping its contract law.  Because contract law confers 
the power to create new rights, this power cannot be defended from an 
autonomy perspective without engaging with its implications on people’s 
autonomy.  That’s indeed quite a different path from the one taken during 
the deontological detour, but it’s the right way for contract theory to go.  
More strongly, it’s the only way to go for a liberal theory of contract, and 
it’s where we turn next. 
 
D.  A New Autonomy? 
 
 Back when Fried was introducing his promise theory, Joseph Raz 
was developing a conception of autonomy as self-authorship, a view 
which has gained prominence because it provides both a compelling 
account of our most fundamental right and a coherent justification for an 
  
 
72
  We believe that justification for the moral obligation of promise-keeping 
is similar, but our intervention in the vibrant philosophical industry on this 
question must await another day. 
 
73 
 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 
74
  Note that you would not be following Nozick who backed away from his 
early views.  See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL 
MEDIATIONS 286 (1989) (“The Zigzags of Politics”). 
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active, modern, liberal state.75  However, when Raz applied his view to 
contract law, the result was problematic, suffering from some of the same 
difficulties as his deontological counterparts.  Nevertheless, Raz provides 
useful building blocks for liberal contract theory, even though he did not 
adequately link them to his own robust conception of autonomy.  Here we 
evaluate three threads in Raz’s scattered and brief remarks on contract. 
 1.  Three Threads.  Raz’s first claim is that the purpose of contract 
law is not to enforce promises, but rather “to protect both the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations and the individuals who rely on that 
practice.” 76  The shift implies that law should prevent the erosion of this 
practice by protecting the “special bond” between the parties that requires 
“the promisor to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the 
promisee.”77  Law’s role in “making good any harm caused by [the] use or 
abuse”78 of the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations is justified if 
and only if “the creation of such special relationships between people is 
held to be valuable.”79 
 While Raz does not elaborate on the justification for invoking law 
to protect and facilitate this practice, we can nevertheless tease out a 
second proposition: it “enable[s] individuals to make their own 
arrangements”; and these “special bonds between people,” which “are 
voluntarily shaped and developed by the choice of participants,” are 
morally desirable.80   Why?  It seems he finds the practice of promising 
valuable due to both its autonomy-enhancing function and the type of 
relationships it creates.81  So far, we agree. 
  
 
75
  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 
76
  Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 
(1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). 
 
77
  Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND 
SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 227-28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. 
Raz eds., 1977).  
 
78
  Raz, supra note 76, at 933. 
 
79
  Raz, supra note 77, at 228.   
 
80
  Raz, supra note 76, at 928, 936; see also Joseph Raz, Voluntary 
Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 
101 (Supp. 1972). 
 
81
  Raz’s recent work on promise shares some of the premises of the transfer 
theorists – analogizing promise to a property conception of gift – and thus shares 
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 Raz’s third proposition – the point where we part ways – relates to 
the role of contract law.  For Raz, such law “is primarily supportive,” an 
unfortunate echo of the deontological approach.  The practice of 
promising, he claims, “is like ownership and the family, which are [all] 
rooted in moral precepts and in social conventions.”  Therefore, the main 
task of contract law for Raz is “recognizing and reinforcing . . . the social 
practice of undertaking voluntary obligations.”  While he acknowledges 
that contract law is not “merely passive” – it can influence the social 
practices it supports, reinforce and extend such practices, and make them 
more reliable – for Raz, by and large, contract law should not be 
understood as “an initiating system, as a means of creating and changing 
social arrangements.”82  
 This final proposition must be rejected for the same reasons we 
have rejected its deontological counterparts.  Contract law is already far 
more active than Raz recognizes.  He states as “fact that the law of 
contracts operates predominantly in a supportive . . . role.”83  But this is no 
fact, as we argue below, and it is a good thing too.  To serve the very 
purpose and values that Raz ascribes to contract law – promoting 
autonomy as self-authorship – the law needs to be, as it already is, more 
active than Raz acknowledges.  
 2.  What’s next?  It is time to admit the failure of the ambitious 
deontological effort.  If the proper meaning of autonomy is merely as a 
constraint, contract may well be impossible, or rather unjustified.  But it is 
neither.  Raz’s account points toward an appealing alternative, even 
though his efforts to link it to contract law faltered.   
 Our way forward is to develop a theory of contracts building on 
this conception of autonomy as self-authorship.  Such a theory answers the 
classical question of contract theory – on what grounds does the obligation 
of agreement-keeping arise? The answer, simply, is that “making 
agreements is instrumentally valuable.”84  The value that contract serves is 
  
similar limitations. See Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT (Gregory Klass et. al eds., 
forthcoming 2014). 
 
82
  Raz, supra note 76, at 916. 
 
83
  Id. at 934. 
 
84
  Cf. Markovits, supra note 55, at 1368. 
 [9/12/2013 Draft]   FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS  
 
20 
autonomy: law (or any pre-legal convention we should respect) empowers 
individuals, as Fried argued, to make agreements that facilitate their ability 
legitimately to enlist one another in pursuing private goals and purposes – 
and thus contract law enhances our ability to be the authors of our own 
lives.  This seemingly simple statement encapsulates one of the most 
difficult challenges of contract theory: just as self-authorship requires the 
ability to write and rewrite our life-story, contract law enables us to make 
credible commitments while safeguarding our ability to start afresh.85 
Being teleological in this sense implies that individuals do incur 
some burden for the common good.  But in the context of contracts, this 
burden is minimal; as we have seen, it simply requires that people not 
invoke the power conferred on them by contract law if they do not intend 
to comply with its rules.86  Further, unlike other teleological accounts of 
contracts, our focus on contracts’ unique, autonomy-enhancing function 
easily explains why a contract creates a duty in the promisor and to the 
promisee: after all, only in this way can contract enable each one of us in 
particular to enlist specific others for our goals.87  
Contract serves autonomy by enabling people legitimately to enlist 
others in advancing their own projects and thus it expands the range of 
meaningful choices people can make to shape their own lives.  That’s an 
important claim, but a preliminary one.  To round out a general, liberal 
theory of contract, we need to know why people want to enlist others in 
their projects.   
 
II. THE GOODS OF CONTRACT 
 
 What are the main goods we seek when we exercise the power to 
contract?  Contract theory must identify these goods, explain how they 
  
 
85
  See infra text accompanying note 188. 
 
86
  See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
 
87
  Cf. Markovits, supra note 55, at 1328, 1348 (Markovits claims that this 
means the essence of all contracts is relational, a claim we criticize in Part II.B, 
infra).  Neo-Kantians (and maybe other corrective justice scholars) are still likely 
to object, insisting that our theory violates private law’s correlativity (or 
bipolarity).  In reply, see HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY ch.5 (2013). 
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relate to each other, and link them to the ultimate value of autonomy.  
Only then can we talk about tailoring contract law to meet its normative 
potential.  In this Part, we show how utility- and community-based theories 
are best understood as essential building blocks in a robust autonomy-
enhancing conception of contract. 88  This argument is not a comprehensive 
survey of the pertinent scholarship, nor does it dive deep into the subtle 
nuances of the accounts we cover.  Our mission is more limited and focused: 
to show how utilitarian and communitarian theories of contract can be reread 
as accounts of the goods of contract an autonomy-based theory must 
recognize and facilitate.  
By focusing on utility and community, we do not deny that other 
values may be justified in affecting contract doctrines.  But autonomy, 
utility, and community (as we render them) are different from other 
values: they participate in law’s vision of the ideal interpersonal 
relationships of contracting parties and thus are qualitatively distinct from 
“external values,” that is, values arising from outside the contractual 
relationship.  Although “internal values” need not enjoy a strict monopoly 
in shaping contract law as some private law purists claim, they are, and 
should be, privileged, such that external values should affect the contours 
of contract law only if they pass a heightened justificatory bar.89 
 
A.  Utility 
 
 1.  The relationship between utility and autonomy.  Some 
economic analyses of contract law conceptualize the field – explicitly or 
implicitly – as a complex set of incentives.   In this view, these incentives 
should aim at inducing potential transactors to behave so as to maximize 
  
 
88
  While the concept of utility is surely not exhausted by material, economic 
welfare, and can encompass social and relational goods, our nomenclature follows 
the conventional focus on contract’s material benefits.  This is also why we use the 
terms utility and efficiency interchangeably. 
 
89
  See DAGAN, supra note 87, at ch.5.  It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to detail how values external to contracting may affect or have affected contract 
law.  For an important discussion of one such value – distributive justice – see 
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and 
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).  
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aggregate social welfare, where welfare is conventionally defined as 
preference satisfaction.90  This understanding has much pragmatic 
strength, but always brings with it an uneasiness regarding the moral status 
of aggregate utility in contract theory.  The moral concerns are familiar:  
some challenge framing the public good in terms of aggregate preference 
satisfaction; others question the legitimacy of using private law for such 
collectivist purposes.91    
We need not resolve this controversy.  Within the domain of 
contract law, many of the lessons of economic analysis are consistent with 
a commitment to autonomy as contract law’s ultimate value.  The reason 
is straightforward, at least from the point of view of our account of 
contractual autonomy.  Often, maximizing the joint surplus is the good, or 
at least a good, of the contracting parties themselves.  For such contracts, 
respect for autonomy entails embrace of economic analysis.  Insofar as the 
efficient reallocation of their respective entitlements is what the parties 
want, and if (but only if) this good does not undermine the ultimate 
normative commitment to autonomy, then these theories converge: to 
respect autonomy, look to efficiency as the measure of ideal law in that 
type of contracting.  (We reserve discussion of values in conflict and of 
how our account differs from economic analysis to Part III, below). 
2.  An application to business contracts.  To demonstrate the 
potential usefulness and limits of the economic analysis of contract law to 
an autonomy-based theory, consider Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s 
work on business contracts, that is, contracts between firms.92  Their 
central organizing question is, “What contract law would commercial 
parties want the state to provide?”93  Their answer is that such law “should 
  
 
90
  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 307 (6th ed. 
2011) (the economic theory of contracts begins with the proposition that 
“[c]ooperation is productive,” and thus “creates value” and concludes that law 
ideally should “induce[] optimal performance and reliance at low transaction 
costs.”). See also, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 123 (8th 
ed. 2011).  Critics of this scholarship also characterize the work this way.  See, 
e.g., SMITH, supra note 3, at 108; Benson, supra note 1, at 54-60. 
 
91
  See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 36, at 297-333.   
 
92
  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003) (defining the firm).  
 
93
  Id. at 549. 
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restrict itself to the pursuit of efficiency alone.”94  They assume there are 
no relevant externalities (or rather that such externalities should be 
specifically targeted by, for example, environmental and antitrust laws) 
and set aside concerns of systematic cognitive error.95  For this 
(externality-free, bias-free, sophisticated-commercial) subset of the 
contractual universe, Schwartz and Scott sensibly identify the good of 
contracting as maximizing the parties’ joint gains, or the contractual 
surplus.96  Given this good, they argue provocatively that much of current 
business contract law is misguided and should be modified so parties can 
more easily generate a larger contractual surplus.97 
  Does this approach fully displace autonomy as contract’s ultimate 
value, even within their sharply constrained sphere of business contracts?98  
It does not, as a close reading of Schwartz and Scott shows.  They do 
assert that business firms are “artificial persons whose autonomy the state 
need not respect.”99  And they do claim that welfare maximization should 
solely guide this contracting sphere.100  But why privilege utility?  For 
them, it’s out of deference to the contracting parties – because of concern 
for “party sovereignty,” a term they emphasize and repeatedly use.101  
  
 
94
  Id. at 545. 
 
95
  Id. at 545-46. 
 
96
  See id. at 544. 
 
97
  Schwartz and Scott thus recommend: (1) reversing some mandatory 
rules, id. at 619; (2) adopting the disfavored textualist approach as the default 
theory of interpretation, see id. at 568-94; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010); and, (3) 
significantly limiting the domain of state-supplied defaults, see Schwartz & 
Scott, supra note 92, at 594-609.  They note, however, two business contract 
settings where legal facilitation is crucial.  Id. at 544; see also infra text 
accompanying note 157 (discussing these settings). 
 
98
  We admit that there may be other possible readings of their framing of 
the role of efficiency in business settings.  Thus, in their response to critics, they 
emphasize other reasons to adopt efficiency above all. See Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 97, at 934-35.  Deference to “the parties’ objective ex ante 
intentions,” though, is mentioned as the premise of “The Case for Party Control.” 
Id. at 939. 
 
99
  Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92, at 556.  
 
100
  See id. at 544. 
 
101
  “Party sovereignty” is mentioned twice, for example, in the short 
conclusion of their piece.  See id. at 618-19. 
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Their account (along with many other similar ones102) seems to stand for 
the following proposition: given the welfare-maximizing goals typical of 
the anticipated parties in business contracts, “party sovereignty” requires 
that the law governing such transactions follow suit.103  But behind the 
“artificial persons” making business contracts stand real people, and it is 
the choices those real people are seeking to make that the law ultimately 
serves. Framed this way, “party sovereignty” devolves to contractual 
autonomy as we define it – it’s a concern best understood as autonomy-
regarding, not utility-maximizing.   
We acknowledge that the significance of party sovereignty can 
also be grounded in epistemological reasons – in which parties are 
perceived as carriers of the best information regarding their preferences – 
so that respecting their choices is just a means for reaching the ultimate 
goal of aggregate welfare.  But we believe that our interpretation of party 
sovereignty is more productive for economic analysis of contract law, 
because it allows legal economists to accommodate their collectivist 
welfare-maximizing methodology within an individualist, autonomy-
regarding normative framework to which they are typically (if implicitly) 
committed.  This interpretation is, in any case, the reason why its findings 
should matter to autonomy-minded contract theorists.   
In our theory, autonomy and utility sit easily beside each other.  
When people choose to come together in their commercial lives, and to the 
extent they are then seeking wealth maximization, contract law should 
facilitate that choice.  Thus, autonomy requires that contract law offer 
various structures for business arrangements – a rich array of corporate, 
partnership, trust, and commercial contract forms.  With the autonomy 
imperative satisfied, the inner life of these contract types should facilitate 
people’s welfare goals, to the extent that is what people are seeking.  
Contract law between such firms, then, should maximize joint surplus, per 
Schwartz and Scott.  This is not because autonomy is irrelevant, but 
because the concept has already done its work at an earlier stage. 
  
 
102
  See, e.g., VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006). Interestingly, this may also be the (or a) way 
to read STEVEN M. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
296-99 (2004). 
 
103
   See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92, at 556. 
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3.  The limits of the business contracts example.  There is another 
lesson we can take from Schwartz and Scott’s careful delimitation of their 
study.  Their sharp focus on business contracts helps “set[] out the 
theoretical foundations of a law merchant for our time.”104  This is an 
important task.  But it cannot be the basis for a general theory of contract 
law.  Even Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that rules applicable to 
externality-free, bias-free, and sophisticated-commercial parties may not 
be suitable for other types of contracts, particularly those involving 
individuals.105  As we move away from their corner case, efficiency 
analysis remains pertinent – because people so often seek material benefits 
when they contract – but “party sovereignty” no longer straightforwardly 
points to maximizing joint economic surplus.  Efficiency analysis does not 
become irrelevant, but its role is necessarily diminished as competing 
values play a larger role. 
Legal economic theorists of contract typically struggle when faced 
with such incommensurable values.106  They respond usually through one 
of two flawed strategies.  The first, and least convincing approach, is to 
deny the conflict and instead assert that efficiency analysis can ground 
normative analysis of contract law as a whole.  When such theorists try to 
explain areas of contracting that are widely understood to be animated by 
quite different values – such as family contracts – the results are 
disappointing. 
The second, inverse approach re-defines and shrinks what 
constitutes the field of contract law.  Thus, for Schwartz and Scott 
contracts between firms are “the main subject of what is commonly called 
contract law,” because other types of contract are governed by other rules, 
outside of “Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the 
provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.”  As they put it, 
contracts “between individuals are primarily regulated by family law 
(antenuptial agreements and divorce settlements) and real property law 
(home sales and some leases)”; contracts “between a firm as seller and an 
  
 
104
  Id. at 550.  
 
105
  Id.  
 
106
  See generally Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: 
Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
749, 751-67 (2011). 
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individual as buyer are primarily regulated by consumer protection law, 
real property law (most leases), and the securities laws”; and contracts 
“between an individual as seller and a firm as buyer, commonly involve 
the sale of a person’s labor, are regulated by laws governing the 
employment relation.”107 
Radically shrinking the scope of contract law is no more appealing 
than over-extending economic analysis.  Schwartz and Scott’s 
observations may reflect the canonical division of labor of contemporary 
contract laws and of the focus of most first-year courses in contract law.  
But labels and syllabi do not define the field of state enforcement of 
voluntary obligations.  Calling business contracts the core does not make it 
so.  We do not get closer to a general theory of contract by excluding the 
vast bulk of contracting which occurs in the spheres of family, home, 
consumer transactions, and employment.  Focusing on business contracts 
has advantages we’ve already noted, but the focus is misleading for the 
rest of contract theory.  Schwartz and Scott may have identified the one 
sphere of contracting in which utility and autonomy concerns seem to 
converge.  Everywhere else, they don’t.  Their example both ignores the 
other goods of contracting and obscures at least part of potential of 
contract as a – maybe the – legal means for enhancing our autonomy.  
 
B.  Community 
 
 1.  The value of community.  People contract not just for economic 
benefits, but also for the social gains that come from working together, 
from taking part in a successful collective enterprise.108  Cooperation, in 
other words, is at times a good of contracting, in and of itself, in addition 
to its importance in facilitating economic success.  People value 
interpersonal relationships – not only for instrumental reasons, as a means 
to some independently specified end.109  Contract may help in furthering 
these intrinsically valuable relationships, and thus provide people an 
  
 
107
  Id. at 544.  
 
108
   Raz addresses this good of contract in mentioning the special bonds or 
relations that contract creates.  See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 
109
  See Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 189, 200 (1997).  
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opportunity to enrich and solidify the interpersonal capital that grows from 
cooperation, support, trust, and mutual responsibility. 
 Community-based (or relational) theories of contract bring these 
interpersonal goods to the fore.  These theories begin with a complaint 
against traditional theories that, for them, are excessively individualistic 
and miss the essence of contract.  Instead, they premise contract on the 
interpersonal relations it creates.110  At times, these theories become as 
over-extended as the theories they criticize.  To say that all contracts are 
necessarily relational, and that community is the core of contracting, 
requires marginalizing large swaths of contracting from analysis – it gives 
results as implausible as those from over-expanding efficiency analysis.   
While the extreme version of community-based theory is not 
useful, a more nuanced reading can enrich our autonomy-based theory.  
Contract law should support individual freedom to form various types of 
communities, just as it should further efficient allocation, when that is what 
the contracting parties seek.  Community-based values, like their economic 
counterparts, are necessary building blocks of a general liberal theory of 
contract. 
 2.  Community, thick and thin.  Community-based theories can be 
divided roughly into two groups, what we call thick and thin accounts.  Ian 
Macneil best represents the former camp and is the scholar most associated 
with the relational understanding of contract.  He has argued that much, if 
not most, contract practice does not comply with the model of a simple 
exchange of goods.111  Varied contract types – in marriage, labor and 
employment, franchising, and other long-term transactions involving asset-
specific investments – differ fundamentally from such discrete contracting.  
Since these long-term contracts are “characterized by complex (ex ante 
unspecifiable) obligations and asset specific (ex post noncompensable) 
  
 
110
  See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 
1419-21 (2004). See also David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational 
Theory of Contract, in THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED 
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3, 5, 9-10, 14 (David Campbell ed., 2001). 
 
111
  See, e.g., Ian Macneil, Relational Contracts: What We Do and Do Not 
Know, in RELATIONAL THEORY, supra note 110, at 257, 261. 
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investments,” they require the parties to “adopt a consciously co-operative 
attitude.”112 
Another typical feature of relational contracts is the significance of 
what may be called “contract governance.”  Although planning the substance 
of the exchange is still important, “many specific substantive courses of 
action cannot be planned in advance.”113  Thus, Macneil points out, more 
emphasis must be placed on the “operating relations” of the parties and on 
“structures and processes.”114  While, at times, much of this governance 
structure is formal and even hierarchical, these contracts necessarily rely also 
on some measure of trust and solidarity.115 And in some types of such 
contracts, the parties “engage in social exchange [and not only in] economic 
exchange,” or at least become highly interdependent, so that their “relations 
tend to include both sharp divisions of benefits and burdens and a sharing of 
them.”116 
 Compare this thick account of contractual communities to Daniel 
Markovits’ theory of contract as the epitome of “respectful communities” 
premised on “the collaborative ideal.”117  This “thin” notion of community 
is sharply limited: it aims to explain the morality of promise among self-
interested strangers.118  Contracts, like other types of promises, establish for 
Markovits “a relation of recognition and respect – and indeed a kind of 
community – among those who participate in them,” and it is “the value of 
this relation” that explains and justifies the morality of promise and the 
legitimacy of contract law.119  This “collaborative” model of contract does 
  
 
112
  Campbell, supra note 110, at 16, 22. See also, e.g., Ian Macneil, 
Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 
578-79 (1986).  
 
113
  Ian Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern 
Contractual Relations, in RELATIONAL THEORY, supra note 110, at 144. 
 
114
  Id. 
 
115
  See id. at 143, 151. 
 
116
  Id. at 136, 146, 148. See also Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 595 (1974) (claiming that “[t]he 
entangling strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence, morality and 
altruistic desires are integral parts of the relation”).   
 
117
  Markovits, supra note 110. 
 
118
  Id. at 1420. 
 
119
  Id. 
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not imply any “concern for other persons’ interests,” but rather “a concern 
for other persons’ intentions and, ultimately, for their points of view.”120  
Thus, it applies precisely to arm’s length contracts between individuals121; 
not to the thicker, more contextual relations that concern Macneil,122 nor to 
contracts involving organizations.123 
Markovits claims that, “as a descriptive matter, contracts among 
individual persons – governed by the doctrines of traditional contract law 
– play a fairly prominent role in many individual persons’ moral and legal 
lives.”124  More strongly, Markovits asserts that contracts between 
strangers “represent the core of contract,”125 and that excluding Macneil’s 
relational contracts and Schwartz and Scott’s business contracts does not 
“undermine the collaborative view’s claim to capture the essence of 
contract.”126  What is that essence?  For Markovits, “[c]ontract law’s 
primary purpose” is “to sustain collaborative agreements among 
individual persons.”127 
3.  The limits of community-based theories.  We disagree with 
Markovits’ and Macneil’s claims to capture the conceptual core of 
contract, just as we disagreed above with Schwartz and Scott.  There is no 
more justification for elevating contracts between individuals than there is 
to privileging contracts between businesses.  (And, as an aside, both these 
approaches have a blind spot for contracts between individuals and 
organizations, in particular consumer transactions, which play such a large 
role in modern life).  All these approaches try to craft a general theory of 
contract from too-limited examples.  And yet, notwithstanding the 
excesses of community-based theory, we find value in these accounts.  For 
example, the decision whether to use a franchise or commercial agency 
  
 
120 
 Id. at 1450-51. 
 
121
  Id. at 1462.   
 
122
  Id. at 1450, 1462.  
 
123
  Id. at 1464-66. 
 
124
  Id. at 1471-72.   
 
125
  Id. at 1421; see also id. at 1450, 1465 (reiterating this point); Daniel 
Markovits, Promise as an Arm’s-length Relation, in PROMISES AND 
AGREEMENTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 295 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011). 
 
126
  Markovits, supra note 110, at 1467. 
 
127
  Id. at 1472.  
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contract can be understood, in part, as a choice between creating thin and 
thick contractual communities.128   
Markovits’ collaborative ideal is indeed a good descriptive fit for 
the contract types on which he focuses, and it captures one normatively 
attractive vision of the relationship that contract law can help establish.  In 
some “contracts involving the purchase and sale of personal property,” 
and even more so “of services in many forms, including childcare and 
elder care, day labor, and services associated with any number of trades 
and professions,”129 contract can serve as a “means by which people can 
“overcom[e] isolation through an intentional pursuit of shared ends,” 
enabling them “to cease to be strangers,” by “enter[ing] into respectful 
relations with each other.”130  But this is not the only interpersonal ideal 
autonomous people can legitimately pursue.131  Sometimes people seek, 
and contract law can help provide, the thick communitarian ideal of 
contractual community envisioned by Macneil.  And sometimes people 
want what we call the “no community” ideal on which many other 
contracts rely.132 
An autonomy-based contract law should facilitate all three 
alternatives (thick, thin, and no-community) and allow people to choose 
from among these ideals as they shape different spheres of their lives.  
Accordingly, contract theory should both embrace autonomy as contract’s 
ultimate value and respect the diverse, sometimes conflicting, substantive 
goods, material and interpersonal, that people seek from contracting. 
  
 
128
  A franchise is thinner than a comparable commercial agency contract, 
because of the fiduciary duties that typify the latter, the agent’s capacity to bind 
the principal, and the potential for respondeat superior liability.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006), §§ 1.01 (fiduciary relationship), 
2.01–2.02 (scope of agent’s authority), and 2.04, 7.08 (scope of respondeat 
superior liability). 
 
129
  Id.  
 
130
  Id. at 1434-35, 1440-41.     
 
131
  We do not deny Markovits’ claim that the contract form implies 
recognition of the other party’s intention and point of view; but because this is a 
very thin requirement, which entails neither respect nor community, such 
recognition may be purely instrumental.   
 
132
  See our discussion of consumer contracts, infra text accompanying notes 
154-156 and 175-177. 
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 III. A LIBERAL AND GENERAL THEORY OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 
 
 With these building blocks identified, we can now set out a liberal 
and general theory of contract law.  There are four ways that our approach 
diverges from prior theories, keyed to the four sections in this Part:  (a) 
We offer a liberal view of contractual autonomy focusing on freedom of 
contracts, that is, parties’ ability to choose from among attractive contract 
types.  This robust contract law can increase human freedom, a claim that 
may seem paradoxical, but is not.  (b) We offer a general theory with a 
conceptually-coherent account of the goods of contracting and their 
interrelationships.  There is no single animating principle that captures the 
quintessence of all contracting practice.  (c) On the descriptive level, we 
develop a taxonomy that identifies the distinctive subject matter and 
recurring dilemmas of each contractual sphere and bridges between 
contract law and theory. (d) Finally, at the normative level, we argue that, 
to enhance freedom in each sphere, contract law must offer a rich menu of 
types with distinct value balances. Just piggybacking on the will of the 
parties does not reflect contract law as it is, nor as it should be.  
 
A. How Contract Law Increases Human Freedom 
 
 1.  The centrality of choice and multiplicity.  The key to 
understanding contractual autonomy is to see it, as we concluded in Part I 
above, as a good that needs to be fostered.  Here, we make the view 
explicit and more precise by adapting Raz’s conception of personal 
autonomy as self-authorship. While his work resonates in political 
philosophy, it can also help ground an attractively-liberal view of freedom 
in contract law.  In particular, we can take two useful points from Raz:133 
  
 
133
  A thorough exegesis of Raz’s “perfectionist liberalism” is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  However, it may still be worthwhile to flag that our 
interpretation of his work is different from Martha Nussbaum’s and similar to 
Alan Brudner’s.  See respectively Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism 
and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011); ALAN BRUDNER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOODS 25 (2004).  
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(1) to be free, individuals need meaningful choice, and (2) states have a 
necessary role in supporting valuable options.134 
 On the first point, freedom requires that individuals be able to 
choose from among options they deem valuable.  The idea of autonomy – 
that people should, to some degree, be the authors of their own lives – 
requires not only appropriate mental abilities and independence, but also 
“an adequate range of options.”135 For choice to be effective, for 
autonomy to be meaningful, there must be (other things being equal) 
“more valuable options than can be chosen, and they must be significantly 
different,” so that choices involve “tradeoffs, which require relinquishing 
one good for the sake of another.”136  
 Thus, autonomy emphasizes “the value of a large number of 
greatly differing pursuits among which individuals are free to choose.”137  
In turn, a society that pursues this autonomy ideal must ensure that there 
exists a wide range of social forms that “leave enough room for individual 
choice.”138  Autonomy contract theorists, including Raz,139 missed the 
significance of this obligation to a liberal account of contracting, maybe 
because they constricted their view of contract down to the symmetrical 
and discrete arm’s length exchange.  While that form is one important type 
of voluntary obligation, it is not an adequate stand-in for contract as a 
whole.  If one takes autonomy seriously, then contract theory must 
celebrate the multiple spheres of contract law rather than suppress them 
(as variations on a common theme) or marginalize them (as peripheral 
exceptions to a robust core). 
 No less significant to choice, and thus to autonomy, is contract 
law’s intra-sphere multiplicity.  Within each sphere, a liberal contract law 
  
 
134
  Doubts as to the necessity of state action in promoting autonomy-
enhancing conditions give rise to the most significant critique of perfectionist 
liberalism: as a form of paternalism.  See JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM 
WITHOUT PERFECTION 85-96 (2011).  Our discussion in Part III.A.2-3 below 
demonstrates that whatever the power of this critique may be regarding other 
implications of Raz’s account of autonomy, it is inapplicable to ours. 
 
135
  See RAZ, supra note 75, at 372. 
 
136
  Id. at 398. 
 
137
  Id. at 381, 399. 
 
138
  Id. at 395. 
 
139
  See supra Section I.D.2. 
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must include sufficiently distinct contract types for the diverse social 
settings and economic functions in which law helps people undertake 
voluntary obligations.  Only such a rich repertoire can enable people to 
freely choose their own ends, principles, forms of life, and associations.  
Consider a few examples where our theory counsels for more choice than 
the law currently offers:   
 (a) Employment types.  First, people should be able to choose 
whether to work as independent contractors or as employees (or to use 
other contract types).  We recognize that classifying the parties’ 
relationships as employer/employee or employer/independent contractor is 
now considered a question of law, so the parties’ characterization of the 
relationship is not controlling.140  Formally, the law refers to a long list of 
non-exhaustive criteria, which seems to imply significant ad hoc discretion 
ex post, and thus to preclude, or at least impede, the parties’ ex ante 
planning.141  But it turns out that the law in action is sufficiently 
predictable that careful parties can fashion their arrangement so that it will 
likely be classified per their mutually desired type.142   In our view, that 
freedom to choose should be simplified and formalized, so that it becomes 
meaningfully available and not just to well-counseled parties. 
 (b) Purchases of Consumer Goods.  As a second example, our 
approach suggests that people should, in some circumstances, be able to 
choose between purchasing a good with the protections of consumer 
transaction law or in an arm’s length traditional sale. We recognize that 
  
 
140
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. b (T.D. 
No. 2 Rev., 2009).  
 
141
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see also 
Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One 
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 (2001).   
 
142
  See Teresa J. Webb et al., An Empirical Assist in Resolving the 
Classification Dilemma of Workers as Either Employees or Independent 
Contractors, 24 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 45 (2008) (deducing three dominant 
criteria: employer control, integration or services, and payment of assistants); 
see, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Do’s and Don’ts When Using Independent 
Contractors, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (June 16, 2011) available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/ content/2011/06/article-wood.shtml; U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Tips for Using Independent Contractors, available at 
http://www.uschambersmallbusiness nation.com/toolkits/guide/P05_0092. 
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consumer protection doctrine applies at least to merchant/consumer 
transactions,143 while sales law applies only to non-merchant sellers (i.e., 
amateurs) and to commercial transactions (i.e. those between businesses).  
Insofar as this division derives from public policy concerns – involving 
possible collective action problems that waivability may trigger144 – we 
have no objection.145  But wherever no such external effects apply, sellers 
and buyers of consumer goods should have an alternative route, so that the 
availability of the consumer contract type would indeed add options, 
rather than just reconfigure an existing one.  We thus support the 
allowance made by Texas for written and signed waivers by well-
counseled individuals who are “not in a significantly disparate bargaining 
position.”146  Similarly, we support the Massachusetts rule that business 
purchasers, which come within the protection of that state’s consumer law, 
may waive their rights even though an individual purchaser could not.147  
 We could multiply the examples – consider cohabitation, civil 
unions, and covenant marriage as alternative types to conventional 
marriage148 – but we have made the point: diversity of contract types is a 
necessary, although by no means sufficient, condition for contractual 
autonomy.  In addition, we must be alert to opportunities for expanding 
choice, such as the Texas and Massachusetts provisions noted above.  
  
 
143
  That is, it applies where a seller who “regularly solicits, engages in, or 
enforces consumer transactions” deals with a buyer purchasing for “personal, 
family, or household” purposes. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 
2(1), (5), 7A U.L.A. 69 (2002).  Consumers, typically, cannot opt out of these 
protections. See CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.2.19.4, at 257-61 (8th ed. 2012); DEE 
PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 
5:21 (2012 ed.). 
 
144
  See Gisela Rühl, Consumer Protection in Choice of Law, 44 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 569, 571-75 (2011). 
 
145
  Recall our recognition of possible normative concerns external to the 
bilateral parties, supra text accompanying note 89. 
 
146
  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (West 2011). 
 
147
  Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 
(Mass. 1990). 
 
148
  For a conceptualization of cohabitation along these lines, see Shahar 
Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationship, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009). 
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Whereas previous theories correctly focused on freedom within a 
particular contract, they have missed the role of freedom across contract 
types. 
 2.  The liberal obligation to provide diverse contract law.  Raz’s 
account of contract, like the account of other autonomy-based contract 
theorists, also missed the generative role of law in offering choices.149  But 
a new take on his rightly celebrated Morality of Freedom can help remedy 
this flaw and highlight the crucial role of law for contract.  As Raz argues, 
given the diversity of human goods from which autonomous people should 
be able to choose and their distinct constitutive values, the state must 
recognize a sufficiently diverse set of robust frameworks for people to 
organize their lives.150  But the state’s obligation to foster diversity and 
multiplicity cannot be properly accomplished through a hands-off attitude 
by the law because such an attitude “would undermine the chances of 
survival of many cherished aspects of our culture.”151 A commitment to 
personal autonomy thus requires a liberal state, through its laws, more 
actively to “enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good” by 
providing a multiplicity of options.152 
 This important obligation is relevant to contract law. As Stephen 
Smith notes, contract law plays a crucial role in the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations by expanding “the range of options 
available to individuals” and thus increasing “the possibility of 
autonomous action.” And while it is difficult to define “what constitutes 
an ‘adequate range of options,’” it seems plausible that “the range of 
options that exist in a society without contract law will sometimes be 
inadequate” and that “contract law makes available options that would 
otherwise be unavailable.”153 
 To be more concrete, deals with strangers – what we call no-
community contracts154 – are an important category of options that 
contract law makes available.  Dori Kimel even puts such deals at the core 
  
 
149
  See supra Section I.D.2. 
 
150
  See RAZ, supra note 75, at 265. 
 
151
  Id. at 162. 
 
152
  Id. at 133, 265. 
 
153
  SMITH, supra note 3, at 139-40.  
 
154
  See supra text accompanying note 132.  
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of contract law.  While we reject his (and any other) essentializing 
strategy, we agree these deals are a big category worthy of attention.  
Kimel argues that the intrinsic value of contracts lies in “the value of 
personal detachment,” that is, of “doing certain things with others” both 
“outside the context of already-existing relationships” and “without a 
commitment to the future prospect of such relationships.”155  Though 
overstated, Kimel’s focus on detachment helpfully demonstrates the 
requirement of active legal support of contracts.  Law is crucial for the 
very possibility of consumer transactions – the paradigmatic contract type 
which responds, in our view, to Kimel’s account of detachment-based, 
autonomy-enhancing contracts.156   
 Beyond enabling consumer transactions (a significant subset of the 
anonymous side of contracting), law is crucial in supporting contracts 
even in the business contracts context.  As Schwartz and Scott observe, 
legal facilitation is indispensable for commercial contracts in two non-
trivial types of cases: “in volatile markets, when a party’s failure to 
perform could threaten its contract partner’s survival; and when 
contractual surplus would be maximized if one or both parties made 
relation-specific investments.”157  Active contract law is no less significant 
in relational contracts as well where it helps facilitate trust-based 
interpersonal relationships.  Though moral commitment, social norms, and 
reputational concerns drive much party behavior, a hands-off policy and a 
minimalist (libertarian) attitude to freedom of contract can hardly suffice 
to overcome endemic difficulties to long-term cooperation.   
 Various impediments to contract are pervasive in all these settings 
– information costs (symmetric and asymmetric), cognitive biases, 
bilateral monopolies, heightened risks of opportunistic behavior, and other 
transactions costs (in the broad sense).158  Merely enforcing the parties’ 
  
 
155
  KIMEL, supra note 69, at 78, see also id. at 79. 
 
156
  Our reference to “law” in general is not coincidental.  While we argue 
that contract law can play a significant role in making consumer transactions a 
viable autonomy-enhancing alternative, we acknowledge that other bodies of 
law, which are regulatory in nature, are also important for this task. 
 
157
  Schwartz & Scott, supra note 97, at 544. 
 
158
  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,  99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); 
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expressed intentions would not be sufficient to overcome the inherent risks 
of such endeavors. Contract laws provide the background reassurances 
that help catalyze the trust so crucial for success.159  Even where law is 
rarely invoked, its active engagement is likely to be the sine qua non that 
makes viable these challenging types of interpersonal relationships.   
In sum, across a range of contracting spheres law must actively 
engage the liberal commitment to contractual autonomy.  The 
impediments to secure contracting often depend on the specific features of 
the contract type at hand and therefore each type requires its own legal 
facilitation.  People can, by and large, further customize their contracts to 
their particular needs and circumstances.  But in most cases these 
refinements build on an off-the-shelf, legal edifice that already addresses 
many of the difficulties they might otherwise have to face.  Thus, many 
valuable forms of interpersonal interaction only become available thanks 
to the active support of law.  Before applying their freedom within a 
particular contract, people need to rely on law’s support for freedom 
across contract types. 
 3. Contract and culture.  Thus far we have discussed how the 
diverse contract types that law facilitates help to overcome various 
bargaining obstacles.  But alongside this material effect, law’s inventory 
of contract types affects our contracting practices in an even more 
profound, albeit more subtle, fashion.  To appreciate this effect, consider 
the difficulties facing parties who seek to shape their contract as, say, one 
of bailment, suretyship, or fiduciary in an environment in which these 
notions have not been coined.  Setting up terms that would duplicate our 
conventional design of these contract types is surely complex, so 
transaction costs along the lines discussed earlier would inhibit such 
contracts in many cases.  But this material aspect does not fully capture 
the difficulty such parties face.  For us, the concepts of bailee, surety, or 
fiduciary have core conventional meanings that make them culturally 
available as possible modes of contracting.  Without such salient 
  
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 
(2000).  
 
159
  See supra Section I.C.2. 
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meanings, which are by and large legally constructed, these parties may 
not even reach the stage of confronting bargaining obstacles, because they 
may face a preliminary impediment, an obstacle of the imagination.   
 By contrast, once the “character” of a contract type or its raison 
d’être gains broad social and cultural recognition, most people (roughly) 
know what they are getting into when they, for example, engage a surety, 
buy insurance, enter consumer transaction, lease an apartment, or start a 
new job.160  In this way, the salient categories contract law employs also 
affect people’s preferences respecting constitutive categories of 
relationships.161  Old-fashioned “freedom of contract” does not fulfill 
these roles.  Freedom to tailor-make terms, while important, does not 
consolidate expectations or express shared normative ideals regarding our 
basic categories of interpersonal relationships.  Consider two examples.   
(a) Suretyship.  Suretyship is a complex contract type, the subject 
matter of a full-blown Restatement,162 an obvious product of legal 
construction distinct from, say, a fiduciary or bailee.163  But the concept of 
a surety, who undertakes an obligation to substitute another’s duty to pay 
(or perform) if that other person fails to do so,164 is widely recognized.  
Many people (vaguely, to be sure) know what it means; at times they even 
know some of its basic rules, such as the right of a surety who was 
  
 
160
  See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 766, 788 (1995) (discussing the accumulated 
outcome of the social learning effect and the network externalities phenomenon).  
The correspondence between contract law and its popular understanding is far 
from being perfect.  Oftentimes, gaps relate to details and thus do not pose a real 
challenge to our claim; but there are admittedly cases where these gaps go to 
some core features of a contract type.  See infra note 269. 
 
161
  Cf. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and 
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1758-59 (1997). 
 
162
  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY (1996). 
 
163
  Suretyships are tripartite agreements where a secondary contract is 
conditional on a benefit for and a failure in the principal contract and in which 
the surety obtains no direct benefit from the arrangement. See 72 C.J.S. 
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY § 12 (Mar. 2013). 
 
164
  See, e.g., Frank S. H. Bae & Marian E. McGrath, The Rights of a Surety 
(Or Secondary Obligor) Under the Restatement of the Law, Third, Suretyship 
and Guaranty, 122 BANKING L.J. 783, 787-89 (2005). 
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required to pay or perform to recover from the primary obligor.165  They 
can thus invoke this contract type as a means for facilitating transactions 
that would have been too risky otherwise because the primary obligor’s 
ability to perform is in doubt.166  Indeed, exactly because contract types – 
like our private law categories more generally – tend to blend into our 
natural environment, they help structure our daily interactions.167   
 (b) Insurance.  As with surety contracts, insurance contracts 
comprise a thick layer of rules that correspond (perhaps imperfectly) to the 
ideal party relationships they anticipate.  They thus participate in the on-
going social production of stable categories of human interaction by 
consolidating people’s expectations of themselves and others.  Consider 
some of the distinctive features of insurance contract law:  the frequent, 
traditional use of the contra proferentem rule against insurers,168 the 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine (in some jurisdictions),169 and the 
emerging doctrine of insurer bad faith.170  These rules are not defects in 
the “general” law, but are instead tools that reflect, and help further 
inculcate, widely-shared understandings of ideal insurance relationships.  
We concede contract law cannot possibly serve this expressive and 
cultural role as to every idiosyncratic arrangement that parties may pursue.  
But it can, should, and to some extent does perform this function 
respecting a limited number of core categories of such arrangements.  
“Freedom of contracts” stands for contract law’s participation in the 
cultural production of diverse contract types among which people may 
  
 
165
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 22(1)(A) 
(1996).  
 
166
  See THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 3:4 (June 2012). 
 
167
  See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical 
Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 195, 212-14 (1987). 
 
168
  See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 628 
(1988). 
 
169
  Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce 
Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance 
Coverage, 5 CONN. INSUR. L.J. 455 (1998). 
 
170
  See James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense 
for Insurer Bad Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (1994) (noting that doctrine 
covers misconduct which results in the delayed receipt of policy proceeds by the 
insured). 
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choose.  This inventory offers people choices they might not bargain for if 
they were defaulted into the prototypical arm’s length commercial 
contract.171  (Consider, by contrast to the saliency of suretyship, the 
“cultural invisibility” of the possibility of job-sharing, which is exactly 
why we will invoke this category as one possible “missing contract type” 
that we recommend adding.172)  Ensuring sufficient diversity of valuable 
contract types is a core feature, benefit, and indeed obligation of a contract 
law regime committed to human freedom. 
 
B.  How Contract Values Relate  
 
 A legal theory that relies on multiple values must address how they 
interrelate.  Because the values we invoke – autonomy, efficiency, and 
community – are oftentimes treated as rivals, our theory carries a heavy 
burden in this arena.  The task of this Section is to show that our freedom 
of contracts approach dissipates some of these apparent conflicts and 
provides important guidelines to the resolution of the others.  
The key to this challenge is to assign each value its proper role.  
Autonomy, we argue, is contract’s ultimate value and the source of the 
state’s obligation to provide meaningful diversity of contract types.  But 
because autonomy is never the reason for making a contract, it cannot be 
its sole value.  Utility and community are contract’s instrumental values. 
Community may even be intrinsically valuable to the extent it is 
constitutive of the autonomy-enhancing potential of certain contract 
types.173 
 1.  Horizontal coexistence.  Sometimes contract’s potential goods 
are in conflict.  What then?  Contract law cannot always help people 
obtain all these competing goods.  While utility and community are often 
mutually-reinforcing,174 at times they push in different directions.  But it is 
  
 
171
  See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (2006) (arguing 
that even “statutory menus that merely reiterate what the private parties could 
have done contractually by other means can have a big effect”). 
 
172
  See infra text accompanying note 268. 
 
173
  On this distinction between ultimate, intrinsic, and instrumental values, see 
RAZ, supra note 75, at 177-78. 
 
174 
 See Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 209-
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not the job of autonomy-friendly contract law to decide which of these 
values trumps or how they should be balanced.  Rather, contract law 
should support multiple contract types, each of which offers a distinct 
balance of goods, so that parties can choose their own favorite balance. 
 Situating utility and community under autonomy’s rule helps 
explain where previous totalizing contract theories have gone astray.  At 
times, people may prefer not to obtain certain goods that other times seem 
fundamental.  Consider the good of community.  Macneil is right to 
highlight the prevalence and significance of diverse relational contracts in 
which interpersonal cooperation is of the essence.  But there are equally 
important contracting spheres for which the communitarian goods he 
celebrates are beside the point, at least for most parties.  Consider the thin 
communities Markovits discusses or the inter-organizational contracts 
Schwartz and Scott address.   
 More pointedly, consider a consumer transaction for a relatively 
inexpensive good or service primarily intended for personal use.  In that 
significant sphere of contracting, the consumer is (typically) uninterested 
in personal relations with the merchant.  Indeed, autonomy is enhanced 
insofar as law helps people make such transactions quickly, anonymously, 
and securely so they can focus their time and attention instead on more 
valuable projects.175  This no-community commitment can explain and 
justify some of the most conspicuous features of consumer contract law,176 
  
10 (1995). 
 
175
  This reconceptualization of consumer transactions, which emerges from 
our discussion of Kimel’s account of contracts, supra text accompanying notes 
155-156, was to some extent anticipated by Karl Llewellyn.  See Robert A. 
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic 
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455 (2002).   
 
176
  Our account of consumer contracts is admittedly ahistorical: this type 
largely resulted from paternalistic regulation that limited classical freedom of 
contract.  See Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the 
Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 187-99 (1997); see generally Anthony 
T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).  
Nonetheless, this contract type enhances freedom of contracts because it likely 
expands buyer autonomy more than it reduces autonomy for sellers (which are 
typically organizations with no claim to autonomy, see infra text accompanying 
note 189).  But because of its autonomy-reducing effect, we argue that law 
should also make available alternative types in settings where consumer 
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such as imposing on businesses heightened duties of disclosure and 
affording consumers certain rights to cancellation and warranty, which all 
go far beyond the protective measures anticipated by “classical” contract 
law.177 
 Relational contracts, business contracts, consumer contracts – all 
support equally fundamental types of human activity; yet each responds to 
different values autonomous people may seek.  This means that the proper 
place for utility and community is not at the level of animating contract 
law as a whole.  Rather, they are components of distinct contract types that 
support people’s diverse pursuits and interests, whether interpersonal 
relationships, the maximization of their joint material surplus, or the many 
permutations between these poles.  Only a sufficiently rich repertoire of 
contract types properly facilitates people’s ability to choose and revise 
their various endeavors and interpersonal interactions. 
 2.  Vertical implications.  If contract law is to live up to its promise 
of enhancing autonomy, it must facilitate people’s ability to pursue the 
utilitarian and communitarian goods that contracts can bring about.  So our 
division of labor does not imply that utility and community are 
unimportant to contract.  If much of the value of contract comes from 
freedom to choose among types, and if the most important values that 
should shape these types are utility and community, then these values are 
nothing short of crucial to contract law. 
And yet we argued that the value of utility and community in 
contract is neither fundamental nor freestanding, but rather derives from 
the way that they serve the parties’ autonomous pursuit of their goals.  
Here we identify two implications of our claim that autonomy is contract’s 
  
transactions do not impose costly external effects.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 143-147.  Making an alternative available means that consumer contracts 
add an option, rather than just limiting an existing one. 
 
177
  See respectively OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Omri Ben-
Shahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (2011); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in 
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 
69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983). 
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ultimate value, while utility and community are the goods an autonomy-
based contract law can help secure. 
(a) Voluntariness as common denominator.  Freedom of contracts’ 
ultimate commitment to self-authorship implies that law should be 
responsible for “creating the conditions for autonomous life, primarily by 
guaranteeing that an adequate range of diverse and valuable options shall be 
available to all.”178  But because autonomy is emphatically “incompatible 
with any vision of morality being thrust down people’s throats,” it must 
stop there and “leave individuals free to make their lives what they will.”179  
This premise implies that contract is – and should remain – a voluntary 
obligation.  People may not be forcibly pushed to seek contract’s potential 
efficiency or community goods.   
This proposition of voluntariness, which underlies the liberal 
commitment to “freedom from contract,”180 constitutes the common 
denominator of the otherwise heterogeneous realm of contract law.  There 
are, to be sure, diverse doctrinal means to ensure voluntariness: in addition 
to doctrines like offer and acceptance and duress, think about the familiar 
common law resort to formalities like consideration or writing181 or about 
the civil law requirement of intent-to-contract.182  So, different liberal 
legal systems may pick and choose among this inventory, or tailor-make 
other tools.  
Oftentimes the choice among many of these tools would be better 
handled if conducted at the level of contract types, rather than at the 
wholesale level of contract law, a move that would allow the rule to be 
  
 
178
  JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY 
OF LAW AND POLITICS 105 (1994). 
 
179
  Id. 
 
180
  On some of the difficult questions this commitment raises, see Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Forward: Freedom from Contract, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 261. 
 
181
  See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 
(1941). 
 
182
  See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW § 2:101 cmt. B (Comm. 
On European Contract Law, Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), OUTLINE EDITION § II: 401 (Christian von Bar et 
al. eds., 2009); EU COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN SALES 
LAW § 39(2) (2011).  
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informed by the type’s animating principle.183  Voluntariness may even 
take different meanings in different contract spheres.  Along these lines, 
scholars have proposed that the parol evidence rule should be relaxed in 
more interpersonal contexts and imposed strictly in high-value corporate 
transactions, where the parties gain more from ex ante certainty and are 
more likely to ensure the contract is the full expression of their 
intentions.184  Despite this value in tailoring at the level of types, a 
common overarching commitment to autonomy implies a trans-
substantive concern for voluntariness,185 especially given the challenge 
that the objective theory of contract poses for this value.186   
 (b) Autonomy as side constraint. While autonomy often recruits 
community and utility to shape the multiple contract types that self-
authorship requires, these values do not always dovetail.  Within any 
particular type, autonomy’s role as the ultimate commitment of contract 
implies that it should generally trump contract’s other values when they 
conflict.  Thus, in addition to the enabling role of autonomy in our theory, 
it also fulfills a protective role by functioning as a “side constraint.”187  
Usually, promoting contract’s other values – utility, community, or 
a blend of the two – does not clash with, and indeed enhances the ultimate 
value of autonomy.  But there are cases when promoting the means might 
undermine the end.  Communitarian demands of loyalty that pose 
  
 
183
  This point applies equally to other general doctrines such as fraud and 
unconscionability whose application varies depending on the context.   See, e.g., 
Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L. 
REV. 49, 50-51 (2008); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in 
Formalism – the Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 1-6 (2012). 
 
184
  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning 
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 
534 (1998).  Others have proposed varying default rules regarding parties’ intent 
to be bound in different situations, such as preliminary contracting or spousal 
promises.  See, e.g. Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 
1480-87, 1488-97 (2009).   
 
185
  In this respect, our analysis converges with Ripstein’s account of a 
“united will.” See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.  
 
186
  See supra text accompanying notes 56-65.  
 
187
  See Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 
MOD. L. REV. 167 (1995).  
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excessive limitations on contractual parties’ exit (that is: on promisors’ 
freedom to change their mind) might collide with party autonomy.188  
Efficient contracts between consumers and organizations may invoke 
similar concerns, given that, unlike consumers, organizations have no 
claim to autonomy.189  In many such conflicts, contract’s commitments to 
community and to utility should give way to rules that best promote 
contract’s ultimate value.  This may justify, for example, limits on 
enforceability of employee noncompete agreements,190 and help explain the 
unilateral right of termination of long-term contracts, which is semi-
inalienable at least regarding certain contract types.191 
 We do not imply that autonomy straightforwardly and necessarily 
trumps utility or community.  Rather, our approach may require exploring 
(at least) two alternative responses.  Thus, it may imply that we should try 
to resolve such conflicts by looking more closely at the meaning of the 
utility or community value for people’s autonomy.192  Just as your garden-
variety contract limits one’s future options in the service of self-
authorship, the vibrancy of certain utility- or community-oriented contract 
types may require curtailing certain future choices; and insofar as a 
(complicated, to be sure) analysis of the overall effects of such limitations 
on people’s self-authorship shows that they are positive, the 
incommensurably higher status of autonomy poses no real difficulty.   
  
 
188
  See generally Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEG. THEORY 165 (1998); 
Dori Kimel, Promise, Contract, Personal Autonomy, and the Freedom to Change 
One’s Mind, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237853. 
 
189
 See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A 
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 77-78 (1986). 
 
190
 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594-619 (1999) (attributing Silicon Valley’s dynamism in part 
to limited enforcement of noncompete agreements); see also Ruth Simon & Angus 
Loten, When A New Job Leads to a Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2013, at B1 
(discussing national variation in enforceability). 
 
191
 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the 
Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., forthcoming 2014). 
 
192
  Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 1520, 1557 (1992). 
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Other conflicts, however, are real and fundamental and may even 
require a (seemingly impossible) tradeoff.  In most of these cases, 
autonomy should take priority.  But we recognize the possibility that (in 
rather rare cases, we assume) this presumption may be overridden if, and 
only if, its costs to the utility or the community goods of contract pass a 
sufficiently high threshold.193  We cannot hope fully to address here the 
challenges of value incommensurability, so for now we just flag the 
concern, and note that its implications for our liberal contract theory seem 
no more intractable than for legal theory in general.194 
3. How we differ from the economic analysis of contract.  Finally, 
because our freedom of contracts approach designates such a significant 
role to utility and thus to the economic analysis of contract law, it may be 
helpful to note briefly how our views differs from theirs.  We see four 
significant distinctions: 
(a) Most basically, whereas the economic canon seeks to facilitate 
preference satisfaction in order to maximize social welfare, we argue that 
such facilitation is important to the extent it is conducive to people’s self-
authorship.  This fundamental difference implies further key distinctions: 
(b) As we have just noted, preferences that undermine self-authorship 
should, in our account, be generally overridden.  (c) Because we claim that 
the goods of contracts sometimes are communitarian in nature, so that part 
of their point is the process (and not just the outcome), we argue that not 
all contract goods are amenable to the maximization formula economic 
analysis employs.  In other words, once the contractual relationship has a 
significant intrinsic value, it can no longer be analyzed in strict instrumental 
terms.195  And last but not least, (d) as we will further elaborate below, an 
autonomy-based account of contracts implies that facilitating minoritarian 
and utopian alternatives may be quite important even if it cannot be fully 
justified in terms of demand. 
 
  
 
193 
 Cf. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 22, at 1-8, 79-104 (defending “threshold 
deontology”). 
 
194 
 See generally Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
 
195 
 See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF 
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 50 (2010). 
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C.  The Taxonomy of Contract Spheres 
 
 We have talked about contract values and their interrelations.  This 
is what makes our theory liberal and general.  Now we provide the bridge 
between our theory and contract law as a whole.  To do so, we reject the 
arm’s length widget sale as contract’s core and we offer, in its place, a 
taxonomy of contract spheres that groups contracting practices according 
to their distinctive subject matter and shared dilemmas.  
 1.  The flattening effect of the arm’s length core.  Like other critics 
of the Willistonian strategy before us, we reject the arm’s length core as a 
description of contract law.196  Our opposition is, we hope, particularly 
pointed because it normatively relies on a commitment to autonomy, the 
ultimate value Willistonian contract law purports to serve.  
 Contract theory had a distinctive twentieth-century trajectory that 
elevated the arm’s length deal image to the core of contract, and, as a 
byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of diverse contract 
types.  Starting with Samuel Williston, through the early Restatements, 
and now pervasive in law teaching, contract theory shifted from concern 
with distinctive types to contract’s trans-substantive, stylized, and 
seemingly universal elements, an approach that makes much of actual 
contracting practice seem peripheral – or outside of contract law 
altogether.197   
 But lawyers in practice cannot rely on “general” contract law to 
understand the key elements of employment, family, real estate or other 
real world contracts.198  To do so would often constitute malpractice.199  
And yet, the paradigm of general contract law dominates contract theory.  
This paradigm not only mis-describes contract law and understates its 
  
 
196 
  See Roy Kreitner, Multiplicity in Contract Remedies, in COMPARATIVE 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 19, 19–20, 38, 49 (Nili Cohen & Ewan 
McKendrick eds., 2005). See generally Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in 
Contract Theory, 45 SUFF. U. L. REV. 915 (2012). 
 
197
   See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 20. 
 
198
   Similarly, law students in upper-level contracts classes must leave aside 
much of what they learned their first-year.  By contrast, other private law fields 
did not go through quite the same theoretical flattening. 
 
199
  Cf. BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 159-
60 (2012) (emphasizing the significance of the differences among contract types). 
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autonomy-enhancing potential; it also generates unnecessary confusion.200  
Consider the following four concrete examples: 
(a) Bailment.  First, the flattening effect of general contract seems 
responsible for much of the doctrinal muddle now troubling bailment law.  
The dominant paradigm interprets the prevailing doctrine as repudiating 
the contractual nature of bailments.  Why?  Because the bailee’s 
responsibility for loss or damage is usually based on a standard of ordinary 
care, in contrast to “general” contract’s typical strict obligation to 
perform.201  The possibility that strict liability exceptions threaten to 
swallow the negligence rule202 is less troubling if both the “rule” and its 
“exceptions” are understood as majoritarian defaults of the bailment 
contract type.  Rather than decide whether to treat bailments “as 
contractual in nature,”203 and thus import all of the “general” contract law, 
reformers should focus on the recurring dilemmas of bailment contracts.   
(b) Liquidated damages.  Another example of the detrimental 
effects of the arm’s length paradigm comes from the standard debate over 
liquidated damages.  From our perspective, this debate seems frustratingly 
futile.  While most arguments in favor of the prevailing rule of ex post 
fairness review anticipate certain types of contracts (in which promisors 
are vulnerable to making suboptimal choices), most of the claims 
criticizing the rule assume a very different set of contract types (where 
sophisticated parties use liquidated damages in anticipation of possible 
unverifiable harms of breach).204  Each argument is right in its own sphere, 
and the rule should likely vary by sphere, rather than be held artificially 
constant to conform to a misplaced notion of “general” contract law.205 
  
 
200
   Our discussion below focuses on the effects of contract’s conceptualization 
on adjudication.  But it surely implies that contract’s autonomy-enhancing 
functioning would be improved if the muddles we identify were removed. 
 
201
   See R.M. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liabilities of Bailees: 
The Elusive Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992). 
 
202
   See id. at 109-29 (describing expansion of strict liability exceptions). 
 
203
   Id. at 99. 
 
204
   Compare, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer 
Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 
100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990) with Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 225-36 (1995). 
 
205
   For indications that courts reduce scrutiny of liquidated damages in cases 
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(c) Promissory estoppel.  Similar confusion and potential 
distortions were generated by the attempt to align intra-family contracts 
with contracts between strangers.  Thus, the perception that once 
promissory estoppel was adopted for intra-familial contracts, it must apply 
to others has led to a morass of practical and doctrinal confusion.  
Businesses were forced to contend with the risk of unexpected obligations 
by the application of ex post judicial enforcement of clearly invalid 
promises on equity grounds in the employment and franchise contexts.206  
Scholars noted the doctrinal confusion introduced by promissory estoppel 
into these contract contexts and some feared that the doctrine would 
consume traditional contract bright line rules aimed at the arm’s length 
contract contexts, such as the doctrine of consideration.207   
(d) Efficient breach.  By the same token, the theory of efficient 
breach runs into its most serious criticism and doctrinal problems when it 
is applied to promises made in the context of a thick community, most 
particularly marriage.208  These problems could be avoided if this doctrine 
were applied selectively to contract types, rather than assuming that once 
introduced to contract law, it must be applied generally.209 
 These brief case studies do not simply reflect the obvious 
prescription that, for abstract principles to be properly applied, they need 
to be carefully adjusted to their context.  Rather, the required differences 
they highlight are best explained by reference to the different animating 
  
involving sophisticated parties, see Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party 
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 512 (2010). 
 
206
  See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:12 (2013); 
Gregory M. Duhl, Red Owl’s Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 307-11 (2003). 
 
207
   See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory 
Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1197-99 (1998).  For other doctrines that are at 
risk, see Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s 
Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1383-85 (1983). 
 
208
   See Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 777, 794-97 (2012); Margaret F Brinig, “Money Can’t Buy Me Love”: A 
Contrast Between Damages in Family Law and Contract, 27 J. CORP. L. 567, 
572-79, 589 (2002). 
 
209
   See also, e.g., Brett E. Lewis, Secondary Obligors and the Restatement 
Third of Suretyship and Guaranty: For Love or Money, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 861 
(1997) (criticizing suretyship law for not distinguishing between compensated 
and uncompensated sureties). 
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principles of contract types that have been improperly lumped together.  
These more fundamental differences may derive from the typical 
normative commitments of a contract type (as in the intra-family vs. 
business contracts) or from its distinctive subject matter (as in bailment, 
or, for that matter, suretyship).  Such examples, and numerous others, 
suggest that in dealing with discrete doctrinal questions, we should 
examine the normative desirability of competing rules vis-à-vis the 
animating principles of their specific contract types (an inquiry that 
requires us to present this principle in its best light possible).   
 But contract theory cannot return to the pre-Williston list of 
contract categories.  That list was an atheoretical mishmash.  What’s 
needed is to replace the old abstractions of the orthodox “freedom of 
contract” model with a theory-driven and descriptively well-formed 
taxonomy for “freedom of contracts.”   
 2.  The four spheres of contracting.  An autonomy-regarding 
theory requires a taxonomy that reflects the typical contexts in which 
people enter contracts and responds to the distinctive dilemmas that arise 
in those interactions.  There are many ways such a taxonomy could be 
constructed.  Here we offer one that collects contract types into spheres. 
 The subject matter of our contracts is bound to make a difference 
regarding the kind of ideals that law can plausibly embrace and hope to 
further.  Thus, along one dimension we distinguish between contracts in 
which the subject matter primarily concerns “people” or “things.”  This 
distinction is neither exhaustive nor stable.210  But the division has some 
appeal: it reflects real distinctions in how contract law operates, and it has 
the virtue (perhaps) of historical pedigree.  Blackstone divided contract in 
part between “rights of persons” and “rights of things.”211  Our second 
dimension concerns whether the locus of contracting is in some sense 
“private” or “public.”  This axis is even less stable than the former (and it 
has been subject to much criticism), but again reflects practices oriented 
toward the internal, domestic, or personal versus those that are relatively 
  
 
210 
  Our cautious language derives not only from the fact that this is a 
preliminary effort, but also from our commitment to a functional dynamic mode 
of taxonomic work.  See generally DAGAN, supra note 87, at ch.6. 
 
211 
  See ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 102-03; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 327-50 (1979). 
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more external.  These two axes yield four salient spheres of contracting: 
family, home, employment, and commerce (fig. 1):   
 
Subject Matter  
People Things 
Private 1.  Family 2. Home 
                Locus   
 Public 3. Employment 4. Commerce 
 
FIGURE 1: Four Spheres of Contracting 
  
 While one can imagine other ways to divide the contractual 
universe (we have no commitment to these axes or labels), this taxonomy 
is helpful here because it is conducive to freedom of contracts’ injunction 
of intra-sphere multiplicity.  It highlights the obligation of liberal contract 
law to support choice within each familiar category of human activity, 
such that, within each sphere, we see contract types that often are 
substitutes for each other.  So, (1) in the sphere of family, we might see 
pre-nuptial, civil union, and co-habitation contracts; (2) in the home: real 
estate purchase and lease contracts; (3) in employment: at-will, for cause, 
independent contractor, and union contracts; and (4) in commerce: sales, 
consumer, insurance, and derivative contracts. 
 Note that in the commerce sphere, the types just mentioned are not 
substitutes for each other, but instead reflect distinctive contracting 
practices.  The sub-spheres of commerce-related contract activity depend 
(roughly) on the sophistication of the parties and the tangibility of the 
contract’s subject (as with figure 1 above, nothing turns in our theory on 
commitment to these particular labels).  The distinctions suggest a second 
matrix with four sub-spheres within the sphere of commerce: (1) 
consumer: including ordinary consumer transactions and software 
licenses, (2) lending and insurance: mortgages, credit cards, health and life 
insurance, (3) sales/business: from commercial sales to partnerships and 
LLCs, and (4) finance/risk: derivatives, guarantees (fig. 2). 
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Type of thing  
Tangible Intangible 
Individual 1.  Consumer 2. Lending/Insurance 
Relative 
Sophistication Corporation 3.  Sales/Business 4. Finance/Risk 
 
FIGURE 2: Sub-Spheres of Commerce 
  
 Why are there so many more contract types within the sphere of 
commerce?  In part, the answer must lie in the stronger incentives for 
individual parties to invest in creating new contract types within this 
sphere.  Even relatively moderate demand can justify creation of a new 
type, so long as that type responds to the balance of contract goods that 
enough people seek.212  Note that the large number of contract types here, 
available even to individuals, suggests that people can handle new types 
without too much danger of confusion.  In other words, communication 
costs – a concern emphasized recently by private law theorists – does not 
justify adherence to the conception of one “general” contract law.213 
 By contrast, there are far fewer contract types in the non-
commerce spheres.  Why?  Perhaps there are weaker individual incentives 
and more substantial collective action problems in demanding new types.  
But that does not mean that there should not be more types.  The 
commerce sphere suggests that confusion among types is not a significant 
problem, and the autonomy perspective suggests that, where effective 
demand is weak, the state shoulders a concomitantly greater responsibility 
to supply valuable new types to ensure sufficient diversity and choice.   
  
 
212 
  Consider, for example, the recent emergence of the “benefit corporation” – 
blending profit and social objectives – in about a dozen states.  See generally J. 
William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation and Statutory Design, REGENT 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).   
 
213 
  The reason for the current over-emphasis on communication costs is that 
they are too often mistakenly conflated with the interests of third parties (whose 
interest is best cast in terms of verification), rather than with the consolidation of 
expectations of the parties inter se and the expression of ideals on core categories of 
interpersonal interaction.  See DAGAN, supra note 52, at 18-20, 31-35.   
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D.  The Goods of Diverse Contract Types 
 
 The final step in creating a general and liberal theory of contract 
law is to specify the link between contract spheres, diverse types, and the 
values people seek.  The multiplicity of contract types is neither chaotic 
nor unprincipled. Rather, it can be explained by reference to the recurring 
dilemmas of the underlying contract spheres and the obligation to provide 
real choice within each of these spheres, including a choice among the 
good of interpersonal relationships, the maximization of joint surplus, or a 
complex and shifting mix of these goals.  In other words, other than the 
ultimate commitment to autonomy, values in contract law are local, not 
global. 
 1.  Value diversity in contract types.  We do not deny that certain 
contract spheres may be more amenable to particular values.  Thus, some 
contract types, particularly in the sphere of commerce, are mostly about 
economic gains – maximizing joint surplus by securing efficiencies of 
specialization and risk-allocation – with social benefits being merely a 
side effect.  Other contract types, say in the family sphere, are more about 
the intrinsic good of being part of a plural subject, where the raison d’être 
of the contract refers more to one’s identity and interpersonal 
relationships, while the attendant economic benefits are perceived as 
helpful byproducts rather than the sole (or at least the primary) motive for 
cooperation. 
 But commitment to contractual autonomy requires attention not 
only to diversity among spheres, but also crucially to meaningful choice 
within spheres.  Within a particular sphere of contracting, contract law 
should offer a sufficiently diverse range of contract types, each 
representing a distinct balance of animating values.  The majority may 
prefer one contract type, but within each contracting sphere free 
individuals should be enabled to contract based on a different value 
balance.  Having forms available to reject makes one’s chosen contract 
type even more of an expression of individual autonomy.   
This is, again, most clearly the case regarding long-term business 
arrangements, where contact law (in the appropriate, broad sense of the 
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word) offers more than one set of defaults, so as to facilitate more than 
one type of interpersonal interaction:214 from agency contracts, through 
partnership contracts (notably LLCs and LLPs), to the various forms of 
corporate contracts (from close corporations to publicly-held 
corporations).215  Each of these contract types is characterized by its own 
governance structure and set of solutions to the typical difficulties (notably 
agency costs) that would probably have inhibited such business activities 
but for their legal facilitation.216 
Whereas the prescription of multiplicity of contract types seems 
straightforward, its implementation is not always simple.  As a first rule of 
thumb, for a contract type to do its autonomy-enhancing work, it should be 
guided by one robust animating value that can effectively consolidate 
expectations and clearly express normative ideals. This rule implies that 
each contract type should be rather narrow, but that many should be 
offered. Thus, a contract type should be split if it addresses too-divergent 
values, as has indeed happened with leaseholds, now largely bifurcated into 
residential and commercial types.217  Opposing this view, we see four 
concerns that may require actively limiting multiplicity:218     
  
 
214
  See Terry A. O’Neill, Toward a New Theory of the Closely-Held Firm, 
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 603, 605 (1993).  See also Edward P. Welch & Robert 
S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 846-47 (2008) (arguing that Delaware law increases 
freedom of contract by creating a “menu” of available options – with mandatory 
restrictions for corporations but not for partnerships or limited liability 
companies – so firms can easily “brand” themselves). 
 
215
  See generally, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (3rd ed., 2009); LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF UNINCORPORATION (2010). 
 
216
  See, e,g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34-35 (1991).     
 
217
  Compare 1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 1:2.1 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th 
ed., rel. 20, 2012) (describing modern approach to residential leases as regulatory 
and replete with “non-waivable rights and obligations [that] may have little to do 
with the history of lease concepts”), with id. § 1:2.2 (observing the lack of any such 
“wholesale substitution for traditional property notions in commercial leasing.”). 
 
218
  Another possible concern is that disaggregating contract law to distinct 
types may hinder cross-fertilization and learning.  But this risk is likely to 
materialize only if we lose sight of the common denominators of the various 
contract types.  
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(a) Cognitive constraints.  If there are too many distinct types, then 
multiplicity itself may curtail people’s effective choice – a paradox that 
cognitive psychologists have found.219  Addressing such cognitive limits is 
a delicate challenge for contract law design. 
(b) Boundary disputes.  Multiplicity may also trigger boundary 
disputes arising from ex post opportunistic maneuvering.220  This 
difficulty does not negate the value of contract type diversity, partly 
because having in mind a salient model (or a few salient models) of the 
intended transaction likely reduces the probability of ex post 
misunderstandings – at least by comparison with the alternative of 
contracting through the necessarily vague “general” contract law.  But 
boundary disputes nonetheless pose a challenge to legal architects. Their 
cost is probably reduced to the extent that law successfully conveys the 
animating principles of the various contract types.  We hope our call to 
reinvigorate their significance in contract law scholarship and education 
makes a modest contribution in this direction.  But this may not be 
enough.  So we acknowledge that boundary arbitrage concerns may justify 
heightened formalities for entry – and such formalities should be refined 
with an eye to ensuring that both parties have the same contract type in 
mind.221 
(c) Market structure. In certain market structures, multiplicity 
might undermine the autonomy of weak parties rather than, as usual, 
augmenting it.  Offering a few alternative, standardized types for the same 
activity typically opens options for weaker parties just as competition over 
prices increases consumers’ choice.  But in certain asymmetric scenarios – 
say, markets for unskilled workers in times of non-negligible 
unemployment – multiplicity may generate a race to the bottom that would 
curtail autonomy.  To the extent contract law reformers subscribe to our 
  
 
219
  See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY 
MORE IS LESS (2004). 
 
220
  See Martjin W. Hesselink, Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract 
Law, 1 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 43, 48-49 (2005).  
 
221
  To preempt an objection, we think such “entry rules” should be shaped 
so that they could not be fairly treated as significant impediments to people’s 
freedom of action.  An alternative strategy to formalities on entry, which we 
disfavor, is one of ex post equitable inquiry. 
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approach, they need to be cautious not to provide multiple forms where 
doing so likely undermines autonomy.  
(d) Political economy.  Certain contract types may be particularly 
vulnerable to the risk of interest group rent seeking.222  When the 
autonomy-reducing consequences of such rent seeking likely outweigh the 
autonomy benefits from an additional contract type, reformers should 
again not support the new type. 
 2.  Tailoring law to local animating values.  Freedom of contracts 
requires that contract law offer different, but equally valuable and 
obtainable, frameworks of interpersonal interaction.  A mosaic of contract 
types within a single sphere of contracting activity is valuable – indeed, 
indispensable – for autonomy. 
(a) Business contracts.  To sustain such a mosaic, contract law needs 
to tailor its rules to the local animating values of each distinct type.  This 
is implicitly the goal of the Schwartz and Scott model.  By concentrating 
on sophisticated organizations seeking the maximization of joint surplus 
as their ideal-typic contracting parties, they insist that business contract 
law should be minimal, that is, it should focus on giving the parties wide 
latitude and enforcing their deal.223   
By contrast, as contract types emphasize more relational goods, the 
contracting parties are increasingly understood, by themselves and others, 
as active participants in a joint endeavor, as members in a purposive 
community.224  Thus, as Macneil emphasizes, governance is of the essence 
regarding many thick relational contract types and law should aim at 
developing governance structures that sustain interdependence and are 
conducive to long term trust and solidarity.225   
  
 
222
  See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L. 
J. 77, 86–90 (2009). 
 
223
  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 
224
  For an example of “general” contract law that supports contracting 
parties in their contractual community, consider the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Although frequently said to inhere in all contracts, in practice it is 
highly context-dependent, as it should be.  See, e.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 719 (7th ed. 2008). 
 
225
  See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
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(b) Agency.  Consider, for example, the agency contract type, which 
structures the agent-principal relationship.  A principal is bound by (and 
may be liable for) her agent’s acts.226  This authority to bind generates 
vulnerability.  Some implications of this vulnerability are straightforward: 
where an agent binds her principal while acting only in the scope of her 
apparent authority, he has a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.227  
Others are more subtle; they imply intricate governance rules,228 dealing 
with topics such as disclosure,229 consultation,230 and adjustments.231  
Because these governance rules are not easily amenable to any form of 
maximization function, agency and other relational contract types are 
qualitatively different from contracts for the pursuit of efficiency gains.232   
(c) Family contracts.  Finally, as we reach the social pole of 
contracting – say in the context of marriage contracts – the contractual 
community is also part of the actor’s own self-understanding.233  As this 
plural identity becomes a more constitutive element of each individual’s 
self-understanding, applying responses from the commercial sphere 
threatens to undermine, rather than advance, the goods these contract types 
aim to encourage.  It is thus not surprising that premarital agreements and 
separation agreements are governed by a unique set of rules – think about 
the fairness review that typifies the former and the possible judicial 
modification for change of circumstances that characterizes the latter – 
  
 
226
  On the agent’s authority to bind the principal, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01–6.02, 2.01–2.02 (2006); on the principal’s liability, 
see id. § 7.03–7.08. 
 
227
  See id. § 8.09 cmt. b. 
 
228
  Cf. DeMott, supra note 191 (forthcoming 2014) (“direction, supervision 
[and] authority . . . loom large in how agency relationship functions.”). 
 
229
  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.11 (2006); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20(1) (2000).  
 
230
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20(1) 
(2000). 
 
231
  Adjustments of relations between the principal and agent are governed in 
part by the doctrine of ratification.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 
4.01–4.08 (2006). 
 
232
  See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 
233 
 See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, 
SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION 2, 8 (1996). 
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which derive more from the typical characteristics of this contract type 
than from any general principle of contract as a whole.234    
As these examples demonstrate, our distinction between utility and 
community is not about whether the contracting activity is economic in 
some absolute sense.  After all, we are dealing with contracts that always 
have economic implications, especially at the “end-game” when the 
contractual community breaks down and people move from cooperation to 
breach.  But colorful dramas at breach should not obscure the daily – and 
ultimately more germane – mid-game life of contract types.235  Hence, we 
focus on the role of contract types as forums for various sorts of 
interpersonal relationships – with thick, thin, or no community, and we 
argue that the predominant character of each contract type along this 
spectrum affects (or at least should affect) its doctrinal architecture.   
 Even rules about end-game breach can be analyzed from this 
perspective because they can, and often do, serve as background norms to 
channel and shape participants’ expectations in the varying contract types 
at stake.236  In other words, mid-game purposes dealing with the daily and 
the mundane should inform end-game rules dealing with failures and 
pathologies.  These distinctions suggest a concrete area for contract law 
reform: in relational contracts, perhaps require the parties to share the 
efficiency gain secured by the promisor’s alternative transaction after 
breach, contra the general law, derived from wealth-maximizing contract 
types, that disallows such recovery.237   
  
  
 
234
  See Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence 
Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 203 (2008). See generally 
Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 249 (2010). 
 
235 
 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-98 
(1996).   
 
236
  See Dagan & Heller, supra note 70, at 597-98; Carolyn J. Frantz & 
Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 95-98 (2004). 
 
237
  See DAGAN, supra note 66, at 278-82. 
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IV.  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES  
 
 We have now set out a general and liberal theory of contract law.  
We cannot hope to explore in this (relatively) concise Article all the 
possible challenges our theory must face or the opportunities it may open 
up.  But before we conclude, we need to address briefly one major 
normative concern, clarify our position on another set of more concrete 
issues, and outline a few reformist directions our approach recommends.  
 
A.  Neutrality and Residual Contracting 
 
 Some readers may worry that rather than serving our liberal 
commitments, a freedom of contracts regime actually betrays them.  Our 
approach, according to this argument, violates “the precept of state 
neutrality” both in its endorsement of self-authorship as contract’s 
ultimate value and in privileging a limited (albeit not insignificant) 
number of contract types.238  Wouldn’t a more neutral regime that equally 
supports all possible arrangements that people might want to take up be 
superior for the task of facilitating people’s ability to choose and revise 
their various endeavors and relationships?  And wouldn’t focusing on 
contract types obscure the significance of “a vibrant general contract law” 
not only for the sake of legislative (or reporting or teaching) economy, but 
also as a liberating device that allows individuals to reject the state’s 
favored forms of interaction and decide for themselves how to mold their 
interpersonal interactions?239 
Let’s start with this last point.  Because we believe that contact 
types share a commitment to voluntariness, we do not call for eradicating 
all general contract doctrines, and agree that some – although by no means 
all – doctrinal implications of this commitment take a trans-substantive 
  
 
238
  This critique blends reference to both “neutrality as a first-order principle 
of justice” and to “neutrality as a second-order principle of justification.”  On this 
distinction and its significance to theoretical liberalism, see Peter De Marneffe, 
Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 253 (1990). 
 
239
  See Martjin W. Hesselink, Private Law Principles, Pluralism and 
Perfectionism, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW (forthcoming 2013). 
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form.240  But voluntariness does not require parties to contract explicitly 
about their relationship.   
A forced contracting system would be quite burdensome, rendering 
certain types of interpersonal relationships too costly to enter into, at least 
for some.  In many contexts it would also still miss the “authentic” 
substantively neutral position, because all contracting schemes ratify the 
parties’ contingent background expectations and power imbalances, so 
that what may seem an innocent equilibrium generated by neutral market 
processes is oftentimes a path dependent contingency that, as such, should 
not necessarily be privileged.241  Further, even if, or to the extent that, the 
freedom of contracts paradigm may entail a crowding out effect, this effect 
seems to be offset by the greater choice of options provided by contract 
types that would cease to exist, or become available only in rather 
circumscribed settings, were it not for the support of the law, as well as by 
a greater choice-making capability within legally facilitated types.   
Finally, whatever detrimental effects law’s active facilitation may 
entail is likely to be remedied if contract law takes seriously our 
prescription of reinforcing minoritarian and utopian contract forms 
(discussed below) and properly structures the residual category of 
freestanding contracting.  Indeed, it seems indispensable to freedom that 
people be able to “invent” their own private forms of contracting outside 
of any familiar contract type (a freedom that distinguishes contract from 
property).  The law governing such residual contracting should be shaped 
with this purpose in mind, rather than piggyback on the arm’s length 
commercial contract that the Willistonian project imagined as the default.  
Our approach also seems to score quite high on the neutrality test.  
To see why, realize that contract law cannot practically give equal support 
to all the possible arrangements people may want to make; further, it 
should not even try to offer such support because having too many options 
may curtail choice just as much as having too few.242  Because law’s 
  
 
240
  See supra text accompanying notes 181-185. 
 
241
  See generally Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path 
Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. Pt. I (forthcoming 2014); 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161, 1171-83 (2003). 
 
242
  See supra text accompanying note 219. 
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support makes a difference – very few contract types would have looked 
as they do, and would have worked as well as they do, without the active 
support of law – contract law necessarily prefers certain types of 
arrangements over others. 
Furthermore, even respecting each contract type, law cannot be 
strictly neutral because every choice of a set of legal rules governing a 
particular contract type facilitates and entrenches one ideal vision of the 
good in that particular context.  But the obligation to provide a diverse 
menu of contract types imposes less than its alternative, namely: the one-
type-fits-all of traditional contract theories with their global, overarching 
principles.  Finally, as a power-conferring body of law, which people can 
but need not invoke or use in pursuing their objectives, it is hard to think 
of any intelligible, let alone neutral, alternative to autonomy as self-
authorship as contract’s ultimate value.243 
  
B.  Mandatory Rules and Sticky Defaults 
 
Our fundamental commitment to voluntariness244 implies that 
people should generally be able to choose not only among various contract 
types, but also terms within each one of them so as to ensure that they best 
serve their own conception of the good and the proper means for realizing 
it, given their particular needs and circumstances. 
Mandatory rules are troublesome from this perspective because 
they do not accommodate heterogeneity, let alone idiosyncrasy.  Thus, 
where no third-party negative externalities are at stake, contract law 
should not mandate its rules; rather, people should be able modify them at 
will, tailoring their arrangements in accordance with how they prefer to 
  
 
243
  See supra text accompanying note 64.  Can democracy serve as such a 
value, so that contract law could safely and solely rely on whatever choices our 
elected representatives entrench in their legislated products?  We do not think so.  
Not only does this suggestion seem to conflate the search for substantive moral 
truth with that of institutional legitimacy (which this Article brackets), but it also 
overstates the comparative advantage of legislatures vis-à-vis courts in private 
law matters.  Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 17 (Shyam Balganesh ed., 2013). 
 
244
  See supra text accompanying notes 178-186. 
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cast their interpersonal relationships.  To be sure, in certain contexts, law 
may legitimately regulate and at times even strictly scrutinize such opt-
outs to guarantee that they indeed reflect people’s informed and rational 
choices.  But, to the extent possible, contract laws should try overcoming 
problems of information asymmetry, cognitive biases, and strategic 
behavior as well as engage in the cultural production of stable 
expectations regarding contract types by prescribing sticky defaults, rather 
than curtailing choice by using mandatory rules.245 
 While the discussion so far does not diverge from that of a more 
traditional freedom of contract analysis, our perspective raises two 
additional explanations for at least some of the mandatory rules and sticky 
defaults that are so prevalent throughout contract’s diverse domain.  
 One reason for refinement emerges from the heightened ambition 
of the classical freedom of contract paradigm.  That model examines the 
impediments to informed cooperation through just one prototypical 
contract form.  Working from the arm’s length merchant transaction, the 
conventional wisdom of freedom of contract analysis struggles to justify 
the diverse settings in which regulation is warranted.  By contrast, our 
freedom of contracts paradigm already anticipates a multiplicity of such 
regulations corresponding to the multiplicity of contract types.  It is no 
stretch for us to claim that contract law must fine-tune its devices to 
address quite diverse challenges.246  
 While this first justification for regulating opt outs focuses on 
assuring that contract types are viable, notwithstanding the systemic 
difficulties they would otherwise encounter, the second turns to the 
concern that easy mutability may undermine their cultural function.  To 
give an example from fiduciary law, the “general” contract law rhetoric of 
gap-filling and optionality may signal indifference towards fiduciaries’ 
duty of loyalty, thus diluting the expressive function of fiduciary law.247  
  
 
245
  Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2012).  Admittedly, at times, mandatory rules may be the 
only credible solution.  See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 102, at 207-14. 
 
246
  See supra Sections III.D.2 & III.A.2.  
 
247
  See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the 
Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 69-70, 91, 116 (2005).  Cf. Dagan, 
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Insofar as these effects threaten the social norms that seem crucial to 
sustaining the fiduciary form, they may also pose a valid concern for 
liberal contract law.  
 On its face, acknowledging these concerns may seem to be in 
tension with the commitment to autonomy.  But it is not.  Properly 
applied, they only mean that opt out may be justifiably regulated if and 
only if three conditions obtain: (1) the regulation is indispensable to the 
viability of that contract type, so that without it people would have fewer 
options regarding a given activity; (2) people can freely invoke the 
regulated contract type, namely that they are also able to engage in that 
activity using an alternative, less regulated contract type; and finally (3) 
the regulation entails the minimal interference with people’s choice 
necessary to overcome the relevant material or expressive concerns.   
 The first condition highlights the possible autonomy-enhancing 
role of mandatory rules and sticky defaults in facilitating, at times even 
enabling, contract types.  Our analysis of consumer contracts as being 
aimed at allowing people to make quick, anonymous, and secure 
transactions248 may be a prime example for a contract type that would be 
meaningless without extensive regulation.   
The second condition is more demanding.  It requires that there 
would be sufficient intra-sphere multiplicity regarding the activity and that 
people indeed make informed choices when invoking the more regulated 
contract type.  People who refuse to enter into what they perceive as an 
overly-regulated contract type should not be deprived of an area of self-
authorship.  (Think again about the possibility of becoming an 
independent contractor left open to someone who finds the immutable 
rules and sticky defaults that typify employment contracts objectionable, 
or the ability to engage in an arm’s length purchase through sales law if 
one objects to the constraints that constitute consumer contracts.) 
Finally, the third condition highlights the significance of sticky 
defaults of various kinds as a preferred alternative to mandatory rules.  Ian 
Ayres has recently demonstrated that sticky defaults may be justified on 
  
supra note 245, at 1436 (referring to a prenuptial agreement providing that a 
given marriage would last for a week or a month). 
 
248
  See supra text accompanying note 177.  
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efficiency grounds.249  Our account shows that at times they may serve an 
important role in enhancing autonomy.  Thus, for example, fiduciary law 
can, and to some extent already does, address the expressive concerns 
noted above,250 while avoiding mandatory rules, by using “impeding 
altering rules”251 which allow only limited, specific initial waivers of the 
duty of loyalty and incorporate further mechanisms to ensure the informed 
consent of the beneficiary (or of the benefactor) and maybe even their 
periodic reconfirmation.252 
Interrogating the validity of mandatory rules and sticky defaults 
along these lines may not redeem them all.  But this refined analysis of 
their relationship to autonomy suggests that at least some of these rules 
may be attractive features, rather than defects, of a liberal, autonomy-
enhancing contract law regime. 
 
C.  Legal Reforms 
 
We hope that by now we were able to convince you that freedom 
of contracts, rather than only freedom of contract, provides both a credible 
description of contract law’s heterogeneous terrain and a promising 
normative foundation that justifies many of its otherwise puzzling 
features.   
1. Concrete examples.  Our approach generates numerous 
theoretical and doctrinal propositions. To note a few, we: (1) 
reconceptualize consumer transactions as “no-community” interactions,253 
  
 
249
  See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Outs: An Economic Analysis of Altering 
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2097 (2012) (sticky defaults can minimize the costs 
of party error (or judicial error) as well as channel contractors efforts towards 
means that better control externalities).  
 
250
  See supra text accompanying note 247.  
 
251
  Ayres, supra note 249, at 2086. 
 
252
  See Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law 
of Financial Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 190, at § III.B.1. 
 
253
  See supra text accompanying notes 154-156 & 175-177.  Consider also, 
along these lines, the way we analyzed the choice between contracts of franchise 
and commercial agency.  See supra text accompanying note 128.   
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(2) reconcile a doctrinal puzzle in bailment law,254 (3) recast the liquidated 
damages debate,255 (4) address the confusion around promissory 
estoppel,256 (5) highlight the cultural significance of contract types such as 
suretyship and fiduciary law,257 (6) cabin Schwartz and Scott’s work to 
settings where the parties seek solely to maximize the contractual 
surplus,258 (7) suggest that promisees in relational contracts get a share of 
the profits captured by their promisors through their efficient breach,259 (8) 
offer an autonomy rationale for semi-inalienable rights of termination in 
long-term contracts and limited enforcement of noncompete clauses in 
employment contracts,260 (9) (cautiously) conclude that wherever no 
external effects are applicable, sales law be an available alternative to 
consumer contract law,261 and (10) refocus the debate over mandatory 
rules and sticky defaults, discussed just above.   
In these and other cases, the key lesson of our freedom of contracts 
approach is to use the animating principle of the particular contract type, 
rather than any “global” principle of “general” contract law, as the 
benchmark for evaluating the law and prescribing guidelines for its proper 
evolution.262  
2.  Market for new types.  Another direction for reform, the market 
for contract types, is implicit in our discussion of the taxonomy of contract 
types and the liberal obligation to provide intra-sphere diversity, but it 
requires some elaboration.  For the most part, creation of new contract 
types has been demand-driven.  We agree with efficiency-based contract 
theories that demand should be an important driver of legal innovation; 
demand for new contract types generally justifies their legal facilitation.263  
In the commercial sphere, there are powerful economic forces catalyzing 
  
 
254
  See supra text accompanying notes 201-203.  
 
255
  See supra text accompanying note 204.  
 
256
  See supra text accompanying notes 206-209; see also supra note 184. 
 
257
  See supra text accompanying notes 162-166 & 247.  
 
258
  See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 
259
  See supra text accompanying note 237.  
 
260
  See supra text accompanying note 191.  
 
261
  See supra text accompanying notes 143-147. 
 
262
  Recall also, along these lines, our analysis of agency contracts and 
marriage contract. See supra text accompanying notes 226-234.   
 
263
  But not always.  See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text. 
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demand – legal entrepreneurs see value from one-off creation of new 
forms that are then standardized, replicated, and sometimes codified as 
discrete types – so the task of contract law can be mostly reactive.264  
There is little reason here to think that long-standing market failures will 
prevent the introduction of valuable new forms, though path dependency 
and stickiness in legal norms may still suggest some role for active legal 
shaping of new forms.265 
 But an autonomy-enhancing view implies an obligation – distinct 
from efficiency theories – that contract law should respond favorably to 
people’s innovations even absent significant demand.  As people’s ends 
move away from strict maximization of economic surplus – that is, for 
most contracting – there is less reason to believe that market-driven 
contract types offer us what we need as free individuals.  In part, this is 
because the social benefits of such new contract types are hard for an 
individual legal entrepreneur to capture. Thus, an autonomy-enhancing 
contract law should prioritize settings where law’s enabling role can best 
support autonomy through new contracting practices. 
 While it is difficult to expect that legal systems would routinely 
invent new contract types, they should favorably respond to innovations 
even absent significant demand, including innovations based on minority 
views and utopian theories, insofar as these outliers have the potential to 
add valuable options for human flourishing that significantly broaden 
people’s choices.266   
  
 
264
  See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of 
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 
265
  This is (roughly) the reason why William Eskridge calls for a legislative 
study commission in his celebration of what he describes as the emergence of “a 
pluralistic family law which relies on ‘a utilitarian framework.’” William N. 
Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided Choice Regime of Menus, 
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1891 (2012).  Similarly, 
long-standing market failures in design of mortgage derivative contracts 
catalyzed recent legislative interventions.  See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK 
ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS 
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES xvi (2008).  
 
266
  Indeed, rather than inhibiting experimentalism – as Oman, supra note 
222, at 94–105, argues – a pluralist contract law, at least in our version, fosters 
experimentalism. 
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 For example, our approach suggest reforming the sphere of 
employment, not just to allow more certain choice between employee and 
independent contractor status, as we proposed earlier,267 but also by 
developing innovative new contract types.  One possibility would be to 
facilitate job-sharing arrangements that stabilize defaults regarding 
responsibility, attribution, decision making mechanisms, time division, 
sharing space and equipment, and availability on off days.268  Another 
type could require an employee to be terminated only “for cause” (the 
explicit choice between a for-cause default and the current dominant “at-
will” default could help clarify the employer’s obligations to the employee 
in a way that formal law so far has not achieved269).  Finally, employment 
contract law can add a viable category of phased retirement that may be 
autonomy-enhancing by reducing the financial and psychological burdens 
of suddenly ending employment, while delivering significant benefits to 
employers by keeping experienced labor in the workforce at a lower 
cost.270 
  
 
267
  See supra text accompanying notes 140-142. 
 
268
  The Federal government has often been proactive in facilitating creation 
of flexible workplaces.  For an outline of the government’s job-sharing policies, 
see U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONAL MANAGEMENT, http://www.opm.gov/ 
employment_and_benefits/worklife/officialdocuments/handbooksguides/pt_empl
oy_jobsharing/pt08.asp.  For a general overview of flexible work arrangements, 
discussion of pros and cons, and a rich selection of secondary sources, see 
CHRISTINE AVERY & DIANE ZABEL, THE FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE: A 
SOURCEBOOK OF INFORMATION AND RESEARCH 37–80 (2001). 
 
269
  Empirical studies have shown that most employees believe their 
employment can be terminated only for-cause, yet about 85% of non-union 
employees can be fired at-will.  See Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't 
Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings That Employees 
Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
307, 309-10 (2002). 
 
270
  Gradual retirement programs can benefit all the relevant stakeholders.  
See Tunga Kantarci & Arthur van Soerst, Gradual Retirement: Preferences and 
Limitations, NIH Public Access, manuscript at 15–16 (2010), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2862495/pdf/nihms-193194.pdf.  
But significant regulatory hurdles remain in the United States. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., Report on Phased Retirement, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2008ACreport2.html (recommending tax 
and other legislative reforms). 
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 Part of the value of these (and many other) minoritarian or utopian 
forms is precisely that most people would not choose them.  Autonomy 
requires that people have the ability to choose from among meaningful, 
distinct options. We are freer people, we are more confident in being the 
authors of our lives, not just through the contract types we choose, but also 
through those we affirmatively reject.  Therefore, even if there is no 
market demand (yet) for certain new contract types, even if they might 
appeal to only a small fragment of potential contracting parties, contract 
law should ensure availability of some such types. 
 While liberal contract law has an obligation to support new 
contract types, there are limits.  At a certain point, the marginal value from 
adding another type is likely to be nominal in terms of autonomy gains.271 
When our autonomy obligations are satisfied, then contract law has 
offered enough types.  For those who still want something more or 
different, they can custom craft their own contract – that is, they retain the 
classical freedom of contract. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
  Once released from the straightjacket of classical contract theory – 
with its search for a unifying principle as its common core – contract law 
proves to be fertile ground for autonomy-enhancing legal creativity.  In an 
increasingly interdependent world, self-authorship often requires people to 
undertake voluntary obligations that can be mutually beneficial.  But we 
face numerous material and cultural impediments.  Liberal contract law 
responds with diverse contract types, properly understood as a repertoire 
of viable options for legitimately enlisting others to our projects in the 
core spheres of life.   
While at first sight an inventory of contract law doctrines 
embedded in an array of contract types may seem confusing, almost 
chaotic, the “freedom of contracts” lens opens a new perspective.  Our 
approach brings focus to the doctrinal muddle and shows that the law’s 
varied solutions to recurring bargaining dilemmas are not random.  They 
  
 
271
  And it may paradoxically undermine choice and thus autonomy. See 
supra text accompanying note 219. 
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respond to the spheres of activity in which people contract, and to the 
different contractual values people are seeking – from utility to 
community.  Putting contract law in context transforms seeming chaos 
into a coherent legal landscape.  “Freedom of contracts” suggests a major 
refocus of how contract theory should be pursued – and how contract law 
should be designed and taught. 
 
